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I. INTRODUCTION
In Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd.,1 plaintiff Peter Lovenheim
asked the D.C. District Court to enjoin defendant Iroquois Brands, Ltd.
∗ This article is a reprint of the article that was printed in the Akron Law Review, Volume 44, Issue
2, 2011. There was a printing error with this article and its corrections are included in this article.
∗∗ Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. The Author is grateful to Peter Lovenheim and
Ralph Halpern, for their willingness to help me reconstruct the background to this case, and also to
my colleague, Rebecca Huss, who helped me to situate the case in two of its important contexts, the
history of animal law and the corporate response to shareholder proposals.
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(Iroquois) from omitting his shareholder proposal from the proxy
materials sent out in advance of its 1985 annual shareholder meeting.2
The proposal related to a French product, pâté de foie gras, which
Iroquois distributed in the United States,3 and which constituted a tiny
part of Iroquois’ business.4 Lovenheim, the owner of two hundred
shares of Iroquois’ common stock,5 called upon Iroquois to investigate
whether the French producer engaged in forced-feeding of the geese,
which Lovenheim considered a form of animal cruelty, in producing the
pâté de foie gras and, if that turned out to be the case, asked Iroquois to
consider discontinuing the product until a more humane means of
production could be developed.6
He decided to submit a shareholder proposal as permitted under
SEC rule 14a-8 (the Rule)7 promulgated pursuant to section 14(a) of the
8
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ’34 Act). Those regulations
provide that a corporation must include qualifying shareholder proposals
in its proxy solicitation materials distributed in advance of annual or
special shareholder meetings, along with the shareholder’s statement in
support of the proposal.9
A shareholder proposal is any
“recommendation or requirement that the company and/or its board of
directors take action” that a shareholder intends to present at a
shareholder meeting.10 The District Court granted Lovenheim’s motion
and preliminarily enjoined Iroquois from sending out its proxy materials
11
without the proposal.
Lovenheim is not only a standard teaching case in corporate law
courses, it is routinely cited by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in response to corporations seeking to exclude shareholder
proposals from proxy materials on the ground that the proposals are not

1. 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985).
2. Id. at 556.
3. Id.
4. See id. at 559 (finding that sales of the product accounted for none of Iroquois’ net
earnings and less than 0.05% of its assets).
5. Id. at 556.
6. Id.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010).
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 895 (1934) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (West 2010)) (amended by PL 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010)).
9. Id. At the time, the proposal, together with the statement in support, must be no more
than 200 words in length. Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. at 557 n.4. The current version of the rule
allows shareholders 500 words to support their proposal. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (2010).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (2010).
11. Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. at 562.
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significantly related to the corporations’ businesses.12 Despite the case’s
prominence, its story has not been told in detail. That is a shame,
because the details of the case are as surprising as its outcome must have
been to Iroquois when the court granted Lovenheim the injunction he
sought.
The case seems like a setup. At the time he invested in Iroquois,
Lovenheim was the Government Relations Counsel for the Humane
Society of the United States (Humane Society) in Washington, D.C.13
Lovenheim had offered the same proposal at the 1983 shareholder
meeting, at which time only about 5% of the voting shares supported it.14
During oral argument, Lovenheim’s counsel conceded that Lovenheim
had no expectation that the proposal would succeed.15 Lovenheim
himself seems to be a front for the Humane Society, and his suit appears
to be a political crusade masquerading as shareholder activism.16 That
is, it seems like Lovenheim was in fact far more interested in stopping
animal cruelty than he was in preserving the value of his investment in
Iroquois stock. After all, his proposal could not have succeeded. Had it
succeeded it only would have required the corporation to form a
committee to investigate the process whereby one of its products was
produced. Lovenheim likely knew that no such investigation was
necessary, since as far as he knew, pâté de foie gras was always
produced through the brutal force-feeding of geese.17 And so the entire
shareholder proposal process, even if successful, would have resulted in

12. A Westlaw search reveals that the case has been cited in five published cases and nearly
150 SEC No-Action Letters.
13. Joyce Tischler, The History of Animal Law, Part I (1972-1987), 1 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. &
POL’Y 1, 40 (2008).
14. Memorandum of Law at 2-3, Iroquois Brands, Ltd., SEC File No. 1-5387 (Jan. 30, 1984)
(on file with author) (submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of
Corporation Finance appealing the Division’s decision regarding the Lovenheim Shareholder
Proposal for Iroquois Brands, Ltd.).
15. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5, Lovenheim v. Iroquois
Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-0734) (on file with the author) (statement of
Lovenheim’s counsel: “I will be the first to admit that in the 43 years of the shareholder proposal
rule only two shareholder proposals have ever been passed, and they basically had management
support.”).
16. One scholar claimed that Lovenheim’s petition had achieved “legendary proportions” as
an example of the extent to which social issue proposals had become “trivial and nonsensical.”
Marilyn B. Cane, The Revised SEC Shareholder Proxy Proposal System: Attitudes, Results and
Perspectives, 11 J. CORP. L. 57, 61 (1985).
17. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 15, at 7-8
(statement of Lovenheim’s counsel acknowledging that force-feeding is the only way pâté de foie
gras is produced).
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a report which would have confirmed what the shareholders already
knew when they overwhelmingly rejected the same proposal in 1983.
This Article is a Law Story.18 Law Stories have many purposes, but
their main goal is to supplement and demystify the case method of legal
pedagogy.19 The case method has been criticized for presenting students
with the law more or less as a fait accompli. The case method assumes a
pre-existing body of law that students passively learn rather than
learning to think of the law as something that they will have a hand in
shaping.20 By placing the (mostly appellate) opinions that law students
read in their various historical contexts, Law Stories transport students
back to a point where the law was uncertain and thus enable them to
better imagine alternatives to existing legal rules and to appreciate the
reasoning underling those rules.
Both Peter Lovenheim and Lovenheim,21 as well as the dynamic of
shareholder proposals, turn out to be far more complicated than the
opinion would lead one to expect, and that is why the case provides the
basis for an especially rich Law Story. First, although Peter Lovenheim
looks, when we are first introduced to him, like a typical shareholder
activist, who was much more interested in pushing a social agenda than
in promoting good corporate governance, he is actually more like the
ideal shareholder proponent. He invested in Iroquois to make a profit,
and he submitted his proposal because he sincerely believed that the
distribution of pâté de foie gras was inconsistent with Iroquois’

18. Many Law Stories are collected in Foundation Press’s LAW STORIES series. A complete
listing of the books in the series is provided on Foundation Press’s website: West Academic,
Faculty
Online
Store,
http://www.westacademic.com/Professors/ProductSearchResults.aspx?tab=6&series=177&searchty
peasstring=ADVANCED-SEARCH (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
19. See Paul L. Caron, Back to the Future: Teaching Law through Law Stories, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 405, 406 (2002) (making the “modest claim” that Law Stories can enrich classroom teaching
through the case method). In 2005, the JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION recognized the importance
of the Law Stories approach by devoting a section of one of its issues to Teaching Law Stories. See
Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts Stories, 55 J. LEG. EDUC. 108 (2005) (book review); Nancy S.
Marder, Teaching Civil Procedure Stories, 55 J. LEG. EDUC. 138 (2005) (book review); Ajay K.
Mehorata, Teaching Tax Stories, 55 J. LEG. EDUC. 116 (2005) (book review); Thomas Ross,
Teaching Constitutional Law Stories, 55 J. LEG. EDUC. 126 (2005) (book review); Laura S.
Underkuffler, Teaching Property Stories, 55 J. LEG. EDUC. 152 (2005) (book review).
20. Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong With Langdell’s Method and What to Do About It, 60
VAND. L. REV. 609, 649 (2007); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education,
1 J. LEG. EDUC. 211, 212 (1948) (faulting the case method for providing solutions to the problems
posed in advance and thus not encouraging students to develop their own powers of reasoning and
problem-solving).
21. 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985).
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corporate purposes and would do harm to the corporation’s reputation
and thus to its good-will value.
Second, although Lovenheim’s proposal did not get very many
votes from his fellow shareholders, Lovenheim regarded the exercise as
a success because soon after the shareholder vote, Iroquois decided to
discontinue distribution of pâté de foie gras. His success, or what he
regarded as success, led Lovenheim to pursue other social goals through
the shareholder proposal mechanism. His experience as a proponent led
him to work with other like-minded shareholders on issues relevant to
the corporations whose shares they owned. The shareholder proposal
mechanism thus stimulates shareholder involvement in corporate
governance. The story behind Lovenheim thus illustrates the numerous
legal and non-legal consequences of a legal rule.
In Part II, this Article explores the law of shareholder proposals and
the reasons why the SEC and the courts permit proposals relating to
social or ethical issues (social proposals) so long as those issues relate to
the corporation’s business. The focus here is on the regulation of such
social proposals.
Other regulations permitting the exclusion of
shareholder proposals will be discussed only to the extent that they
interact with the Rule relating to social proposals. Part III presents the
complete narrative of the Lovenheim case, providing details that are not
captured in the decision or in the limited secondary literature relating to
the case. Part IV explores the legal landscape in the aftermath of
Lovenheim. The decision may well have been a surprising one, and this
final section explores the reasons why the decision remains the leading
case on social proposals.
As discussed in Part IV of the Article, opinions on the value of
social proposals hinge on opinions on the purposes of corporations and
the roles of shareholders in the corporations in which they own shares.
Corporations seem to recognize the value of permitting social proposals,
as they can provide a relatively inexpensive safety valve for dissent22
and thus permit the kind of beneficial exchange between management
and shareholders that promotes the legitimacy of corporate
decisionmaking processes. While corporations might regard these
benefits as slight, the expense of social proposals is also very small.
Corporations thus have little reason to appear to be attempting to
obstruct one avenue of meaningful dialogue between management and

22. Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal
Rule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635, 635 (1977); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy
Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1494 (1970).
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shareholders when the traffic along that avenue relieves stress from the
system and thus helps guarantee that the main arteries of commerce will
not be blocked.
II. HISTORY OF SEC IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 14(A) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
One might reasonably ask why we permit shareholder proposals in
the first place. After all, it is a fundamental premise of corporate
governance that managers manage.23 Shareholders may be the beneficial
owners of the corporation, but the separation of ownership and control is
one of the key advantages of the corporate form.24 Although shareholder
activism has always been one of the ingredients of U.S. corporate
governance,25 Congress had acted in the early twentieth century to limit
the ability of financial institutions to participate in corporate affairs.26
However, in response to its perception that corporate management was
abusing the proxy solicitation process,27 Congress granted the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the SEC) broad power to regulate proxy
solicitations in section 14(a) of the ’34 Act,28 and the current form of
23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2010) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors . . . ); Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1994)
(“Under normal circumstances, neither the courts nor the stockholders should interfere with the
managerial decisions of the directors.”); Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810, 814
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing general corporate principles granting broad discretion to corporate
management in permitting Standard Oil to exclude a shareholder proposal related to fostering the
development of petroleum reserves and working to create an international regime to manage the
exploitation of mineral resources).
24. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 7 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that
centralized administration is a necessity in a large corporation and that shareholders as such do not
participate in the day-to-day management of the corporations); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C.
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & Econ. 301, 301-02 (1983) (arguing that
“separation of decision and risk-bearing functions survives . . . in part because of the benefits of
specialization of management and risk bearing but also because of an effective common approach to
controlling the agency problems caused by separation of decision and risk-bearing functions.”).
25. See Stuart L. Gillian & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the
United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 55 (2007) (noting the role of financial institutions as
shareholder activists in the early 20th century).
26. See id. (citing the Glass Steagall Act as well as regulatory reforms that followed the 1929
stock market crash, which had the cumulative effect of widening the gap between ownership and
control in U.S. public corporations).
27. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 22, at 636 (claiming that, prior to 1934, management
was soliciting proxies without informing shareholders of the matters to be considered at the annual
shareholder meeting and then using the favorable proxies thus obtained to control the meeting and
for other questionable purposes).
28. Section 14(a) of the’34 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
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shareholder activism is a product of an SEC rule first introduced in
1942,29 the predecessor to the current Rule.30 The Rule requires
management to include in its proxy materials, sent out in advance of
annual shareholder meetings, shareholder proposals to be voted on at
those meetings so long as the shareholder meets certain conditions to
qualify as a proponent.31
Since section 14(a) simply prohibits deceptive practices in the
solicitation of proxies, it is not obvious that the Rule implements the
congressional legislation.32 The SEC interpreted section 14(a) as
insuring fair corporate suffrage and “shareholders who were enlightened
not only as to the financial condition of the corporation, but also as to
the major questions of policy, which are decided at stockholders’
meetings.”33 In order to ensure that proxy materials accurately reflected
all issues that would arise at an annual meeting, the SEC interpreted its
own rules to permit shareholders to present proposals at annual
meetings.34 As one court put it, “[C]orporate circulation of proxy
materials which fail to make reference to a shareholder’s intention to
present a proper proposal at the annual meeting renders the solicitation
inherently misleading.”35 Others have pointed out that these rules were

instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange
or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or
authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered
pursuant to [section 12 of the ’34 Act].
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 895 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
78n(a) (West 2010)) (amended by PL 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010)).
29. The Rule was first designated Rule X-14A-7. Duty of Management to Set Forth
Stockholders’ Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942).
30. Gillian & Starks, supra note 25, at 55.
31. In its current version, the Rule requires that shareholders hold a minimum of $2,000 worth
of shares in the corporation or more than 1% of the corporation’s outstanding shares and hold those
shares for a minimum of one year prior to making the proposal. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1)
(2010).
32. See George W. Dent, SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1985) (noting that neither the text nor the legislative history of section 14(a) mentions
shareholder proposals); Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule,
18 GA. L. REV. 425, 465-66 (1984) (arguing that the Rule is hardly likely to achieve Congressional
intent to assure fair corporate suffrage).
33. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp.
877, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
34. Id.
35. N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Am. Brands, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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necessary in any case to safeguard the rights of shareholders recognized
under state law.36
A.

Implementation of the Rule 1942-1970

In enacting section 14 of the ’34 Act, Congress responded to an
unpleasant by-product of the separation of ownership and control in the
structure of corporations. “[A]s management became divorced from
ownership and came under the control of banking groups, men forgot
that they were dealing with the savings of men and the making of profits
became an impersonal thing.”37 Congress chose to regulate corporate
proxies as one mechanism for preventing management from
circumventing “fair corporate suffrage.”38
1. Overview of SEC Regulation of Social Proposals
The SEC’s initial regulatory efforts in this area were directed at
promoting “full and fair corporate disclosure regarding management
proxy materials.”39 In 1942, the SEC took the logical next step by
adopting a rule that required management to include in its proxy
materials shareholder proposals that constituted a “proper subject for
action by security holders.”40 This seemed to offer shareholders an
extensive right to provide their input to management, but the SEC
immediately saw the danger that shareholders would use the proposal
mechanism to raise matters that bore little relationship to company’s
affairs. In 1945, the Commission issued a release opining that
“proposals which deal with general political, social or economic
matters” are not proper subjects for shareholder action.41

36. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (mandating an annual shareholder meeting at
which “any other proper business may be transacted”); see also Milton V. Freeman, An Estimate of
the Practical Consequences of the Stockholder’s Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 549, 549 (1957)
(calling fundamental aspects of Rule 14a-8 “an almost necessary consequence of the status of the
individual shareholder under the laws of the various states of incorporation”). Freeman served in
the SEC’s General Counsel Office from 1934-42 and as its Assistant Solicitor from 1942-46. Id. at
549 n.*.
37. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934)).
38. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934)).
39. Id. at 677 (citing 3 Fed. Reg. 1991 (1938); 5 Fed. Reg. 174 (1940)).
40. Duty of Management to Set Forth Stockholders’ Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
3347, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942).
41. Exchange Act Release No. 3638, 1945 WL 27415 (Jan. 3, 1945) (interpretation of Rule X14A-7).
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Between 1943 and 1970, shareholders submitted proposals on a
variety of issues, but the main focus of shareholder activism in the years
between World War II and the Vietnam War was corporate
governance.42 Shareholders sought accountability from boards and
management and improved performance that would increase the value of
their shares.43 There arose in the 1940s the phenomenon of the “gadfly
investor.” Three such investors, Lewis and John Gilbert44 and Evelyn
Davis, still accounted for 30% of the resolutions submitted to
corporations as late as 1982.45 Their prominence among proponents led
to cries that the process was being abused by people who were not
interested in the economic well-being of the corporation but by people
promoting “crackpot” ideas or “afflicted with an insatiate desire for
personal publicity.”46
The SEC’s approach to shareholder proposals has tended to mirror
the times. As one commentator put it, in the 1950s, the SEC “added
layers of conditions to the rule and gutted meaningful shareholder
access.”47 The SEC relaxed its restrictions during the Vietnam and
Watergate eras before again seeking to “squelch access” during the more
conservative 1980s.48 In 1984, the SEC granted no-action letters to 78%
of the corporations that requested them.49 The trend towards a restrictive
reading of shareholder rights continued into the next decade. By the
mid-1990s, the SEC was 30% more likely to permit the exclusion of
proposals relating to corporations’ social responsibilities than it had been
in the 1980s.50
42. See Gillian and Starks, supra note 25, at 56 (finding that, as late as 1978, 611 of 790
proposals received by member companies of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries dealt
with governance issues).
43. Id. (characterizing the first three decades of shareholder proposals as “aimed at improving
performance and raising share values”).
44. Lewis Gilbert had been called the “most celebrated minority stockholder.” LOUIS LOSS, 2
SECURITIES REGULATIONS 903 n.182 (2d ed. 1961). His main concerns were undeclared dividends
and the installation of accounting and monitoring devices to improve directors’ accountability to
shareholders. Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate
Democracy 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 117 n.77 (1988). He and his brother accounted for nearly half the
shareholder proposals offered from 1948-1951 and for nearly 2/3 of the proposals offered in 1955.
Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45
ALA. L. REV. 879, 897 n.74 (1994).
45. Gillian and Starks, supra note 25, at 56.
46. See Arthur D. Chilgren, A Plea for Relief from Proxy Rule 14a-8, 19 BUS. LAW. 303, 30304 (1963) (finding it inconceivable that the majority of shareholder proposals “result from stock
purchases made with any serious investment intent.”).
47. Palmiter, supra note 44, at 879-80.
48. Id. at 880.
49. Cane, supra note 16, at 60.
50. Palmiter, supra note 44, at 882, 913.
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2. The Rule in the Courts
The first significant court case testing shareholders’ ability to
challenge management on issues of corporate governance through the
mechanism of the shareholder proposal came in SEC v. Transamerica
Corp.51 The main issue in the case was the scope of the “proper subject”
for shareholder action referenced in the Rule.52 Transamerica argued
that shareholder proposals must relate to a subject matter on which
shareholders were permitted to vote under all legal requirements,
including those found in the corporation’s charter and by-laws.53 The
SEC took the broader position permitting proposals on any subject
matter in which a shareholder had an interest under state law.54
The court sided with the SEC, stressing that Transamerica’s reading
of the Rule would circumvent Congress’ intent “to require fair
opportunity for the operation of corporate suffrage.”55 Because a
corporation must be run for the benefit of its stockholders and not for
that of its managers,56 management could not be permitted to place
technical provisions of a corporation’s charter or by-laws beyond the
reach of the shareholder vote. “The control of great corporations by a
very few persons was the abuse at which Congress struck in enacting
section 14(a).”57
Although it supported shareholder rights in the Transamerica case,
between 1948 and 1954, the SEC repeatedly revised the Rule to limit the
ability of shareholders to make proposals. In 1948, the SEC permitted
corporations to exclude from their proxy statements proposals relating to
personal grievances and proposals submitted by shareholders who did
not attend the annual meeting, either in person or by proxy.58 In 1952,
the SEC made a further attempt to prevent shareholder proposals from
becoming a forum for the airing of political grievances, permitting
corporate managers to exclude proposals submitted “primarily for the
purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious,
social or similar causes.”59 The propriety of this regulation was not
51. 163 F.2d 511 (3d. Cir. 1947).
52. Id. at 515.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 518.
56. Id. at 517.
57. Id. at 518.
58. Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4185, 1948 WL
28695 (Nov. 5, 1948).
59. Amendment to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4475, 1952 WL 5254 (Dec. 11,
1952).
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tested for nearly two decades.60 The SEC again expanded the
permissible grounds for exclusion in 1954, permitting corporate
management to exclude proposals relating to “ordinary business
operations,” proposals that would violate state law and resubmitted
proposals that had recently been overwhelmingly rejected.61
Like these SEC revisions to the Rule, the case law in the two
decades following the Transamerica62 decision was decidedly favorable
to the discretion of both corporate management and the SEC, both of
which inclined towards excluding proposals, especially social proposals.
For example, in Peck v. Greyhound Corp.,63 shareholder Peck brought a
proposal calling on the corporation to abolish its segregated seating
system in the South.64 Greyhound sought to exclude the proposal and
relied on the 1945 SEC release cited earlier,65 stating that it was not the
intent of the Rule “to permit stockholders to obtain the consensus of
other stockholders with respect to matters which are of a general
political, social or economic nature.”66 The SEC staff agreed with the
corporation’s assessment of the propriety of the proposal, finding that it
was not on a “proper subject.”67 The Peck court did not go so far as to
endorse Greyhound’s interpretation of the 1945 SEC Release.68
However, the court denied Peck’s motion to enjoin Greyhound from
soliciting proxies and holding its shareholder meeting unless Peck’s
proposal was included in Greyhound’s proxy materials, finding that Peck
had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.69 The court
believed that Peck must first pursue SEC review of its staff’s no-action
letter before seeking the injunction.70 In addition, the court noted that
considerable deference was due to the SEC’s interpretation of its own

60. See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“So far
as we have been able to determine, the Commission’s interpretation or application of this rule has
not been considered by the courts.”).
61. Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4979, 1954 WL
5772 (Jan. 6, 1954).
62. 163 F.2d 511 (3d. Cir. 1947).
63. 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
64. Id. at 680.
65. See Exchange Act Release No. 3638, supra note 41.
66. Peck, 97 F. Supp. at 680 (citing Exchange Act Release No. 3638, supra note 41).
67. Id. at 680.
68. Id. at 681.
69. Id. at 680-81.
70. Id. at 681.
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rules and also found that Peck could not establish that he would be
irreparably harmed if his injunction were denied.71
The trend towards deference to SEC decisions continued in Dyer v.
SEC,72 which raised the same kinds of corporate governance issues that
the Third Circuit had found a proper subject for shareholder proposals in
73
Transamerica. In Dyer, plaintiffs sought to force management of the
Union Electric Company to include in its proxy materials eleven
resolutions, by-law amendments, and amendments to the articles of
incorporation.74 Some of the proposals had been the subject of a
previous suit; others had been submitted and overwhelmingly rejected
by shareholders in recent shareholder meetings.75 The Dyer court
recognized the Transamerica decision as one with which it needed to
come to terms. However, it found the two cases easily distinguishable.
In Transamerica, the SEC had supported inclusion of the proposals, and
doing so was in accordance with Delaware law.76 In Dyer, by contrast,
the SEC supported the corporation’s decision to exclude the proposals.77
In addition, the court characterized as “almost fanciful” petitioners’
argument that the SEC was without rational basis to exclude their
proposals, which were inconsistent with Missouri law, when
management had agreed to the inclusion of a substantively similar
proposal that was properly submitted under Missouri law.78
While there seems little doubt that the Dyer court reached the right
conclusions with respect to the proposals at issue in that case, the
opinion is significant in the deferential language it adopted with respect
to determinations of the SEC staff.79 The court took the lack of case law
challenging SEC determinations on shareholder proposals as evidence

71. Id. The proposal may have been excludable in any case because it would have put the
company in violation of state laws then assumed to be valid. See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v.
SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
72. 289 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1961).
73. 163 F.2d 511 (3d. Cir. 1947).
74. Dyer, 289 F.2d at 243.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 246.
77. Id. at 423.
78. Id.
79. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social Responsibility: The
Need to Reform the Federal Proxy Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 50 RUTGERS. L. REV. 33, 50
(1997) (finding a deferential posture in the court’s reference to a “lack of reported decisions”
relating to shareholder proposals as evidencing general acceptance of the SEC’s regulatory
judgments in the area).
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that courts and shareholders alike were willing to accept such
determinations as within the province of the SEC.80
Deference to management and the SEC characterized decisions in
this area into the late 1960s, when the courts dealt another blow to
shareholder activism in Brooks v. Standard Oil Co.81 In that case,
plaintiff offered a resolution that called on Standard Oil to intensify its
effort to encourage exploration of the world’s continental shelves for oil
reserves and to encourage the creation of an international regime over
undersea mineral resources.82 Standard Oil notified the SEC that it
intended to exclude the proposal, asserting that the proposal could be
omitted because it: (1) was not on a proper subject for shareholder
action; (2) related to ordinary business matters; and (3) primarily sought
to promote a general economic or political cause.83 Plaintiff, an attorney
with expertise in the utilization of underwater mineral resources beyond
national jurisdiction,84 sought a declaratory judgment that his resolution
was on a proper subject for action by shareholders.85
The SEC issued Standard Oil a no-action letter on the ground that
the proposal was not a proper subject for action by shareholders.86 In so
doing, the SEC clearly violated its own rules.87 The Rule required that,
if the corporation claimed a legal ground for the omission of a
shareholder proposal, the corporation must include a “supporting
opinion of counsel” with its notice of intention to omit.88 Since Standard
Oil provided no such opinion of counsel, it could not possibly have met
89
its burden of production. However, the court concluded that plaintiff
was not harmed by the SEC’s failure to adhere to its own procedural
requirements, as Standard Oil’s opinion of counsel would have relied on
the same legal arguments as Standard Oil presented in the court case.90
Moreover, citing an earlier ruling in the Dyer91 litigation, the court

80. See Dyer, 289 F.2d at 245 (“Presumably, from the lack of reported decisions, the denials
of attempts by stockholders in other public holding company situations to have inclusions made in
management’s proxy material must generally have had their end in an acceptance of the regulatory
judgment which the Commission has exercised in the particular situation.”).
81. 308 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
82. Id. at 811.
83. Id. at 811-12 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1), (2), (5)).
84. Id. at 811.
85. Id. at 810.
86. Id. at 812.
87. Id. at 813 (citing Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, supra note 61).
88. Id. at 811 n.2 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d)).
89. Id. at 811 n.2.
90. Id.
91. 289 F.2d 242.
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adopted a highly deferential approach to review of SEC no-action letters,
accepting the SEC’s judgment “unless it can be said that what has been
done is without any rational basis on all the elements involved.”92
The only issue for the court to resolve then was whether the SEC
had correctly construed New Jersey law relating to the relative powers of
corporate management and shareholders. The parties agreed that there
was no New Jersey authority for whether or not plaintiff’s proposal was
a proper subject for shareholder action.93 However, the court cited both
New Jersey law and the Standard Oil by-laws, which both provided in
nearly identical language that “the business and affairs of [the]
corporation shall be managed by its board.”94 The court further relied on
case law to extend something like the business judgment rule95 to the
shareholder proposal context as well. The court cited two opinions of
New Jersey’s Chancery Court, one from 1891 and one from 1942. The
first stated that “[q]uestions of policy of management . . . are left solely
to the honest decision of the directors, if their powers are without
limitation and free from restraint.”96 In the later case, the Chancery
Court cited the “well-settled rule of law that questions of business policy
devolve upon the officers and directors. . . .”97 The court noted that most
of the proposals that had been approved concerned matters relating to
the selection, retention, and accountability of officers and directors98 and
appeared to treat that fact as evidence that corporations were only
required to include such proposals in their proxy materials.
Thus, three decades after the SEC first adopted the Rule, the scope
of the right of shareholders to bring proposals at annual meetings was

92. Brooks v. Standard Oil, Co., 308 F. Supp. 810, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing Dyer, 266
F.2d at 38). The court also relied on Peck to support its deference to the SEC’s construction of its
own rules. Id. at 813 (citing Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp 679, 681 S.D.N.Y. 1951)).
93. Id. at 814.
94. Id.
95. The Delaware Supreme Court defines the business judgment rule as “a presumption that
in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent
an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1984) (citations omitted), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 2000). See D. A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure and Executive
Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 833-38 (2007) (noting that the business judgment rule has
been variously understood as a presumption, a heightened standard of review and a doctrine of
judicial abstention).
96. Brooks, 308 F. Supp at 814 (citing Ellerman v. Chi. Junction Ry. Co., 23 A. 287, 292 (N.J.
Ch. 1891)).
97. Id. (citing Laredef Corp. v. Fed. Seaboard Terra Cotta Corp., 25 A.2d 433, 437 (N.J. Ch.
1942)).
98. Id.
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narrowly circumscribed in two ways. First, the SEC was granting noaction letters with respect to all proposals except those relating to
selection, compensation, and accountability of managers. Second, the
courts had adopted a highly deferential approach to SEC decisions, even
if those decisions were taken at the staff level. This trend was to change
dramatically with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Medical Committee for
Human Rights v. SEC.99
B.

The Medical Committee Opinion

The Medical Committee for Human Rights (Medical Committee)
obtained, by gift, shares in the Dow Chemical Company (Dow).100 On
March 11, 1968, the Medical Committee’s national chairman, Dr.
Quentin Young, wrote to Dow and enclosed a first version of the
Medical Committee’s shareholder proposal.101 The proposal requested
the Board of Directors to amend Dow’s certificate of incorporation to
provide “that napalm102 shall not be sold to any buyer unless that buyer
gives reasonable assurances that the substance will not be used on or
against human beings.”103 In the accompanying letter, Dr. Young
conceded that its primary motivation was the Medical Committee’s
concerns for human life, but he also noted that the Medical Committee’s
investment advisers suggested that napalm production “is also bad for
our company’s business as it is being used in the Vietnamese War” in
part because it was making it “increasingly hard to recruit the highly
intelligent, well-motivated, young college men so important for
company growth.”104 In addition, the letter noted that the impact on the
company for its decision to manufacture napalm was global.105
Dr. Young’s language, espousing an economic interest in the
corporation, was necessary to overcome language in the Rule that
permitted a corporation to exclude a proposal “if it clearly appears that
the proposal is submitted . . . primarily for the purpose of promoting
general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.”106
99. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
100. Id. at 661.
101. Id.
102. Id. Napalm is an aluminum-based soap, which is combined with gasoline to form a syrup
used in chemical warfare. Id. It was developed by Harvard University scientists during World War
II in order to increase the range of flamethrowers while also greatly increasing the temperature at
which the fuel in such flamethrowers burned. Id. at 661 n.1.
103. Id. at 662.
104. Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 662.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 676 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1970)).
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Still, the original proposal was susceptible to exclusion under another
regulation that permitted omission of proposals seeking management
action “with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary
business operations of the issuer.”107
The Medical Committee had submitted the 1968 version of its
proposal after the deadline for submitting such proposals and Dow, not
surprisingly, refused to include it in its proxy statement.108 In January
1969, having received no further communications from Dow, the
Medical Committee re-submitted its proposal.109 After Dow notified the
Medical Committee that it intended to omit the proposal from its proxy
110
statement, the Medical Committee sought to revise the proposal.
Acknowledging that “management should be allowed to decide to whom
and under what circumstances it will sell its products,” the Medical
Committee nonetheless urged that “the company’s owners have not only
the legal power but also the historic and economic obligation to
determine what products their company will manufacture.”111
Accordingly, the Medical Committee enclosed a revised proposal
requesting that the Board “consider the advisability of adopting a
resolution setting forth an amendment to [Dow’s certificate of
incorporation] that the company shall not make napalm.”112
Dow was unmoved by the amendments and sent the SEC a
memorandum stating its reasons for omitting the proposal.113 The SEC
Division of Corporation Finance granted a no-action letter.114 The
Medical Committee duly appealed, but the full Commission approved
the recommendation of its Division of Corporation Finance.115 The
Medical Committee next appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals
116
for the D.C. Circuit.
Given the case law since Transamerica,117 it was not entirely clear
that the federal courts had jurisdiction to review SEC decisions relating
to shareholder proposals, or that such review should occur in the Court

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 679 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1970)).
Id. at 662.
Id.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
163 F.2d 511 (3d. Cir. 1947).
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of Appeals.118 As the court noted,119 after the Southern District of New
York’s ruling in Peck that a shareholder must exhaust administrative
remedies through appeal to the Commission itself before seeking review
in a federal court,120 shareholders would have faced quite a procedural
conundrum if the D.C. Circuit had now ruled that exhaustion of
administrative remedies barred a shareholder from review in a federal
court. However, the D.C. Circuit also recognized that there was some
dicta and some scholarly comment suggesting that no-action letters in
the shareholder proposal context were not reviewable orders.121 Still,
after an extended discussion,122 the D.C. Circuit concluded that the SEC
determination was reviewable123 in the Court of Appeals.124
Having failed to persuade the Court of Appeals that it was without
jurisdiction to review SEC decisions in such matters, the SEC
nonetheless argued for a level of judicial deference to the SEC’s views
akin to that accorded to prosecutorial discretion.125 The court did not
feel the need to accord the SEC such deference, in large part because of
evidence of frequent procedural irregularities in the SEC’s internal
review of shareholder proposals.126 The most serious charge, the court
noted, was
all too clearly illustrated by the record in the present case: the lack of
articulated bases for past decisions encourages management to file
shotgun objections to a shareholder proposal, urging every mildly

118. See Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 665 (noting that the most difficult issues in the case arise
from Dow’s and the SEC’s claim that the SEC decision is not a reviewable order under section
25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act); id. at 672 (noting that “the essential question . . . is whether
the district court is a more appropriate forum for adjudication of petitioner’s claim than” the Court
of Appeals).
119. Id. at 667 n.9.
120. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
121. See Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 666 n.5 (citing dictum from Klastorin v. Roth, 353 F.2d
182, 183 n.2 (2d Cir. 1965) and one article from a practitioners’ publication but no holding on
point). Subsequent to the Medical Committee case, two Circuit Courts adopted the position that
SEC no-action letters are not reviewable orders. See Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the proper course of action if a
shareholder believes that a corporation has improperly refused to include a proposal is to seek
judicial review of the propriety of that action in a district court); Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641,
645-46 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dismissing action for want of jurisdiction and distinguishing Medical
Committee on the ground that in that case the Commission had reviewed and affirmed the staff noaction recommendation and in the current case the Commission had refused comment on staff
action).
122. Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 665-72.
123. Id. at 672.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 673.
126. Id. at 674.
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plausible legal argument that inventive counsel can contrive, in the
hope that the Commission will accept one of them.127

The Court inferred that the effect of SEC “discretion” was to
dispose of controversies through “calculated non-decisions that will
eventually cause eager supplicants to give up in frustration and stop
‘bothering’ the agency.”128 The court then proceeded with a limited
review of the SEC’s determination: “if the Commission was found to
have proceeded on erroneous legal principles, the Commission would be
ordered to proceed within the framework of its own discretionary
authority on the indicated correct principles.”129 Although the Court
deemed it “obvious to the point of banality to restate” Congress’ purpose
in enacting section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it
nonetheless noted that Congress’ intent was “to give true vitality to the
concept of corporate democracy.”130 That purpose could not possibly be
frustrated by a remand to the SEC to articulate the grounds underlying
the grant of its no-action letter.
The court then proceeded to a discussion of the merits of the case.
As indicated above, Dow sought to exclude the Medical Committee’s
proposal on two grounds: that its concerns were essentially political
rather than economic and that it related to ordinary business
operations.131 The court conceded that these two limitations on the
corporation’s obligation to include shareholder proposals in its proxy
materials were “on their face, consistent with the legislative purpose
underlying section 14.”132 The court deemed it “fair to infer” that
Congress would not have desired that proxy solicitations become a
vehicle through which “malcontented shareholders [could] vent their
spleen about irrelevant matters.”133 Congress may well also have
anticipated that “management cannot exercise its specialized talents
effectively if corporate investors assert the power to dictate the minutiae
of daily business decisions.”134
Still, in language that indicated a radical shift from earlier case law,
the court acknowledged the risk that the two exclusions could be
construed so as to exclude almost any shareholder proposal on the

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 676.
Id. at 665-72.
Id. at 678.
Id.
Id. at 679.
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ground it is either too general or too specific.135 The court found that
Dow had attempted to either dash the Medical Committee’s proposal
against the Scylla of generality or to drown it in the Charybdis of
specificity and that the SEC had accepted Dow’s decision to exclude the
proposal without even identifying which of these hazards had provided
the substantive ground for its decision.136
With respect to the claim that the Medical Committee’s proposal
was “too specific,” in that it related to Dow’s ordinary business
operations and was thus excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(5), the court
remarked that the scope of ordinary business operations was to be
determined based on governing state law.137 However, Delaware law
permits amendments to a corporation’s certificate of incorporation so as
to “change, substitute, enlarge or diminish the nature of the”
corporation’s business.138 The court found no evidence in the record to
support Dow’s contention that the proposal was not for a proper purpose
under Delaware law.139 Departing from the reasoning of the Brooks
court,140 the Medical Committee court criticized the SEC for its
“superficial analysis” of applicable state law and found that the SEC had
failed to comply with its own requirement that management sustain the
burden of proof when seeking to omit a shareholder proposal.141
The court characterized as “somewhat more substantial” Dow’s
argument that the proposal could be excluded as “too general” under
Rule 14a-8(c)(2), which permitted exclusion of proposals that are
primarily political in nature.142 However, the court was unpersuaded by
the Dow’s memorandum of counsel on the subject, which simply
described the sorts of political protests of which Dow had been a target
because of its government contracting in connection with the Vietnam
War and then reached the “abrupt conclusion” that the proposal should
therefore be excluded.143 The court was unwilling to connect the dots
and to treat the proposal as representing nothing more than another

135. Id.
136. See id. (stating that the SEC “made no attempt to choose between” the two “potentially
conflicting arguments” and, relying on Dow’s stated reasons, accepted Dow’s decision to omit the
proposals).
137. Id. at 680.
138. Id. at 680 n.29 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a)(2), (d) (1968)).
139. Id. at 680.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
141. Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 680.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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example of protest tactics relating to Dow’s contracts with the
144
Department of Defense.
Here again, the court returned to Congress’ intentions in passing
section 14(a) of the ’34 Act, whose “overriding purpose” it was “to
assure to corporate shareholders the ability to exercise their right—
some would say their duty—to control the important decisions which
affect them in their capacity as stockholders and owners of the
corporation.”145 In light of this congressional purpose, the court could
find no reason why management should be permitted to
place obstacles in the path of shareholders who wish to present to their
co-owners . . . the question of whether they wish to have their assets
used in a manner which they believe to be more socially responsible
but possibly less profitable than that which is dictated by present
company policy.146

Moreover, in this case, there was ample evidence that Dow’s
management was itself motivated by a political purpose and not by the
profit motive. According to the court, Dow’s own publications
proclaimed:
[T]hat the decision to continue manufacturing and marketing napalm
was made not because of business considerations, but in spite of them;
that management in essence decided to pursue a course of activity
which generated little profit for the shareholders and actively impaired
the company’s public relations and recruitment activities because
management considered this action morally and politically
desirable. . . . We think that there is a clear and compelling distinction
between management’s legitimate need for freedom to apply its
expertise in matters of day-to-day business judgment, and
management’s patently illegitimate claim of power to treat modern
corporations with their vast resources as personal satrapies
implementing personal, political, or moral predilections. It could
scarcely be argued that management is more qualified or more entitled
to make these kinds of decisions than the shareholders who are the true
beneficial owners of the corporation.147

Not only did the court think that the corporation had not borne its
burden under the SEC’s regulations, it also asserted that the

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 680 n.30.
Id. at 680-81.
Id. at 681.
Id.
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regulations—at least as applied in this case—could not be harmonized
with Congress’ intent in adopting section 14(a) of the ’34 Act.148
The case was remanded to the SEC for reconsideration in light of
the court’s opinion and with instructions that the basis for the SEC’s
decision must appear in the record “not in conclusory terms but in
sufficient detail to permit prompt and effective review.”149 The SEC
was sufficiently concerned about the consequences of the decision to
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.150 However,
before the Court could decide the case, Dow included the proposal in its
annual proxy materials, and it received votes from less than 3% of the
shares that participated.151 The Supreme Court reasoned that, given this
meager support for the proposal, Dow may decide to include it if it were
re-submitted in the future rather than litigate.152 The facts thus no longer
presented an active case or controversy, and the case was dismissed as
moot.153 The status of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was thus unclear.
C.

The Effect of Medical Committee

In the aftermath of Medical Committee, the number of shareholder
proposals increased dramatically, as did the number of proposals relating
to social issues.154 In addition, the SEC for the first time revised the
Rule in a way that restricted the ability of management to exclude such
155
In 1972, the SEC revised the
proposals from its proxy materials.
portion of the Rule relating to the exclusion of social proposals,
permitting the exclusion of proposals only if they were not “significantly
related to the business of the issuer or not within its control.”156 In 1976,
148. Id.
149. Id. at 682.
150. SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 401 U.S. 973 (1971).
151. SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 405-06 (1972).
152. Id. at 406.
153. Id. at 407.
154. Estimates range on the number of social proposals offered during this period, but there is
no doubt that there was a significant increase. See Liebeler, supra note 32, at 431 (stating that the
number of social proposals increased from six in 1972 to 322 in 1976); Schwartz & Weiss, supra
note 22, at 637 n.11 (stating that there were 133 social proposals raised in eighty-eight separate
shareholder meetings in 1976, both of which were record highs). Liebeler provides a statistical
breakdown on shareholder proposals between 1975-76 and 1982-83. During that period, social
proposals accounted for a high of 46.3% of all proposals in 1975-76 and reached their numerical
peak in 1980-81, when 372 were offered. Liebeler, supra note 32, app. at tbl.1. Rates at which
proposals were excluded pursuant to SEC no-action letters also peaked in 1975-76, when 38.5% of
all proposals were excluded. Id.
155. Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 9784, 1972 WL 125400 (Sept. 22,
1972).
156. Id.
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the SEC again revised the Rule, eliminating all reference to social or
political proposals.157
As we shall see, the Medical Committee opinion influenced Peter
Lovenheim to become a shareholder activist. He was not alone.
Between 1976 and 1983, social proposals accounted for over 20% of all
proposals received each year by the American Society of Corporate
Secretaries.158 However, after a 1983 revision of the Rule that required a
proponent to own $1,000 worth of stock in the issuer, the number of
159
social proposals dropped by more than half.
III. FAIR IS FOWL: THE STORY OF LOVENHEIM V. IROQUOIS BRANDS
Peter Lovenheim was something of an amateur investor. When he
found out about a company that he liked, he would buy shares. In the
fall of 1981, he bought 200 shares of the common stock of Iroquois160 on
the advice of his fiancée, who was a nutritionist,161 and had
recommended the Schiff line of vitamins that Iroquois distributed.162
Lovenheim also saw potential for Iroquois’ stock “because of its
involvement in the expanding market for health foods and natural
foods.”163 Within a few months of purchasing his Iroquois stock,
Lovenheim received proxy materials from which he learned that
Iroquois marketed Eduard Artnzer pâté de foie gras in the United
States.164 Foie gras is a gourmet food produced from the livers of
domesticated geese raised on a carbohydrate-rich diet.165

157. See Palmiter, supra note 44, at 911 (stating that the number of social and political
proposals “exploded” after the 1976 reforms).
158. Liebeler, supra note 32, at 466.
159. See Bruce Ingersoll, Annual Meetings Are Much Calmer Affairs Under Changed SEC
Shareholder Rules, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1985 (“The number of shareholder resolutions filed on
social and ethical issues fell from 215 in 1983 to 93 [in 1984] and 83 [in 1985] . . . . ”).
160. Affidavit of Peter C. Lovenheim at 5, Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp.
554 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-0734) (on file with the author).
161. See PETER C. LOVENHEIM, PORTRAIT OF A BURGER AS A YOUNG CALF: THE TRUE
STORY OF ONE MAN, TWO COWS AND THE FEEDING OF A NATION 64 (2002) (describing his wife as
a nutritionist).
162. Telephone Interview with Peter C. Lovenheim (Mar. 5, 2009).
163. Affidavit of Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 160, at 2.
164. Id.
165. F. BARBARA ORLANS, ET AL., THE HUMAN USE OF ANIMALS: CASE STUDIES IN ETHICAL
CHOICE 227 (1998).
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What’s Good for the Goose: Lovenheim’s First Shareholder
Proposal

Lovenheim had originally been attracted to Iroquois because the
corporation marketed products that promoted healthy lifestyles.166 He
did not think that encouraging the consumption of pâté de foie gras was
consistent with the rest of Iroquois’ product lines, nor did he think that
other like-minded shareholders would want Iroquois to be involved in
the distribution of pâté de foie gras if the production of the product
involved significant animal cruelty.167 Although Lovenheim was
working at the Humane Society at the time of the lawsuit168 and was
described in the press as “an animal rights activist,”169 he would later
describe himself as someone who did some work for the Humane
Society when he was just out of school but was not “an animal rights
person.”170 Lovenheim was not a strict vegetarian.171
The corporation’s view of itself was very different from the way
Lovenheim understood it. Although it did market natural foods and
vitamins as two of its product lines, those product lines were by no
means central to the corporation’s mission or identity. Iroquois started
out as a brewery and, at the time Lovenheim invested, distributed many
diverse product lines, ranging from Champale to Yoohoo, through
numerous subsidiaries.172

166. Id. at 229.
167. Telephone interview with Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 162.
168. See Tischler, supra note 13, at 40.
169. See Jerry Knight, Force-Feeding Moral Issues onto Corporate Agendas, WASH. POST,
Mar. 11, 1985, at Bus. 1 (referring to the case as a “landmark lawsuit” brought by “an animal rights
activist”).
170. See LOVENHEIM, supra note 161, at 192 (expressing concern, as he was preparing to visit
a slaughterhouse that he might be denied entry because of the company’s suspicions as to his
motives). Lovenheim never wanted to become a one-issue person. Interview with Peter C.
Lovenheim (Sept. 27, 2009) (audio tape on file with author). He had worked as a freelance
journalist during law school, and after he graduated, his first job was with a small non-profit that
promoted the legal interests of journalists in freedom of information. Id. Having worked on that
issue for a short time, and having written a couple of pieces of journalism that related to animal law,
Lovenheim then moved to a position with the Humane Society. Id. He was there for only a couple
of years before he moved on to his next project. Id.
171. See id. at 64 (“My diet mostly reflects the ambivalence I’ve felt since childhood about
eating animals: sometimes I have; sometimes I haven’t.”). Lovenheim claims that he has been a
vegetarian since Portrait of a Burger was published, but his son claims to have seen him eating a
turkey sandwich only recently. Interview with Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 170.
172. Telephone interview with Ralph Halpern (July 10, 2009).
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According to Lovenheim, the process of force-feeding usually
173
At farms where the
begins when the birds are four-months old.
process has been mechanized, the birds are placed in a metal brace and
the neck is stretched so that a funnel may be inserted 10-12 inches down
the bird’s throat.174 Four hundred grams of corn mash are then pumped
into the birds’ stomachs, while an elastic band around its neck prevents
regurgitation.175 Where the process is done by hand, the feeder uses a
funnel and a stick to force the mash down the bird’s throat.176 The birds
are force fed for between 15 and 28 days, and shortly thereafter they are
slaughtered.177 During the brief period of force-feeding, the geese
double their weight, but their livers swell until they account for up to
10% of the bird’s total weight. An ordinary goose liver weighs about
120 grams; the liver of a force-fed bird weighs between 800 and 1000
grams.178 Up to 10% of the birds die before they can be slaughtered as a
result of the forced feeding.179
On May 10, 1982, Lovenheim wrote to Iroquois’ management and
requested that it look into the possibility that the pâté product that it was
distributing was produced through forced-feeding of geese.180 The
corporation did not respond to that letter or to subsequent
communications.181 So, on December 14, 1982, Lovenheim, on his own
behalf and on behalf of the Humane Society, wrote a letter to Terence J.
Fox, the president of Iroquois, enclosing a shareholder proposal for
inclusion in the company’s proxy materials for action at the next
Iroquois annual shareholder meeting to be held in May 1983.182 The
letter stated that the proposal was prepared in accordance with the
relevant regulations promulgated by the SEC.183 Lovenheim also
notified the corporation that he intended to attend the annual shareholder
meeting.184

173. Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, 618 F. Supp. 554, 556 n.2 (D.D.C. 1985) (citing Affidavit
of Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 160).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. ORLANS, supra note 165, at 229.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Transcript of Annual Meeting of Stockholders of Iroquois Brands Ltd. 12 (May 10, 1983)
[hereinafter 1983 Annual Meeting Transcript] (on file with the author).
181. Id.
182. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to Terrence J. Fox, Chairman of the Bd, Iroquois Brands,
Ltd. (Dec. 14, 1982) (on file with the author).
183. Id. (citing 7 C.F.R. 240.14a-8).
184. Id.
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Under the regulations operative at the time, Lovenheim was eligible
to submit a proposal based on his ownership of 200 shares of stock in
the corporation for at least one year prior to the shareholder meeting.185
Lovenheim’s proposal noted that Iroquois “strives to maintain a
reputation as a distributor of wholesome foods” and characterized the
proposal as seeking “to assure that [Iroquois Brands, Ltd.] is not
inadvertently promoting cruelty to animals and does not risk damaging
its reputation as a distributor of wholesome food products.”186 The
proposal then asked the corporation to do the following:
[F]orm a committee to study the methods by which its French supplier
produces pâté de foie gras, and report to the shareholders its findings,
together with its opinion, based on expert consultation, as to whether
or not this production method causes undue distress, pain, or suffering
to the animals involved and, if so, whether further distribution of this
product would risk damaging the good reputation of the Corporation
and should therefore be discontinued until a more humane production
method is developed.187

The proposal indicates how, notwithstanding Medical Committee,
shareholders still had to steer between the Scylla of generality and the
Charybdis of specificity.
Presumably, Lovenheim knew or suspected that pâté de foie gras is
always produced through the force-feeding of geese, and he really
wanted Iroquois to stop distributing the product because its distribution
encouraged what he considered a form of animal cruelty. But under the
SEC rules operative at the time, shareholders could not bring proposals
relating to the continuation of a particular product, as control over
ordinary business operations was entrusted to management alone.188 Nor
could Lovenheim bring a proposal that simply denounced animal cruelty
and demanded that Iroquois adopt a position consistent with his ethical
objections to inhumane treatment of animals without running afoul of
the SEC regulation intended to prevent the shareholder proposal from
being abused as a mechanism of general political protest.189 As a result,
the shareholder proposal has a bit of absurdist theater about it. Proposals
must ask the board to form a committee to investigate a matter and make
185. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(1) (1982).
186. Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders of Iroquois Brands, Ltd., scheduled on May
10, 1983, at 18 (Mar. 28, 1983) [hereinafter 1983 Notice of Annual Meeting] (on file with the
author).
187. Id.; see also Lovenheim, v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1985).
188. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1982).
189. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1982).
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recommendations.190 That way, the shareholder does not interfere with
the conduct of ordinary business operations, as the final decision is left
in the discretion of the board.
The corporation responded with a letter from Iroquois’ General
Counsel requesting certification of the number of shares owned by Mr.
Lovenheim and the Humane Society.191 Lovenheim got back to Iroquois
just five days later, providing certification of the shares owned by the
Humane Society. As the SEC regulations did not require him to state the
quantity of shares owned by a person bringing a shareholder proposal,
Lovenheim pointed out that he did not need to provide the certification
requested, but he did state that he had owned 200 shares of Iroquois
common stock since 1981.192
The corporation had no further objection to Lovenheim’s proposal.
It included the proposal in the proxy materials distributed in advance of
its May 1983 shareholder meeting.193 It also included its own
recommendation that shareholders vote against Lovenheim’s
194
While noting that the corporation “deplores cruelty to
proposal.
animals in any form and commends the Humane Society of the United
States for the important work it does to alleviate such practices,”195
management gave the following reasons for its opposition: (1) Iroquois
exercised no control over the production of the French pâté; (2) the
product is tested and approved by the Federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA); (3) it is unnecessary to form a panel of directors
to study an issue over which the board has no control; and (4) the
product in question “represents an infinitely small percent of Iroquois’
sale and profits” – in fact the expert consultation called for in the
190. Proposals calling for the formation of a committee of investigation have become the norm
when shareholders offer social proposals. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 821 F. Supp. 877, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (addressing the
excludability of a proposal requesting that Wal-Mart’s directors prepare and distribute reports
relating to the company’s equal opportunity hiring and procurement policies); N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret.
Sys. v. Dole, Food Co, 795 F. Supp. 95, 96, (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (addressing the excludability of a
proposal requesting the Board of Directors to establish a committee for the purpose of evaluating
the impact of proposals for health care reform and their impact on the company); Austin v. Consol.
Edison Co., of N.Y., Inc., 788 F. Supp. 192, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (addressing the excludability of a
proposal requesting that shareholders adopt a non-binding resolution endorsing the idea that the
corporation’s employees should be allowed to retire after 30 years of service, regardless of age).
191. Letter from Ralph L. Halperrn, Gen. Counsel for Iroquois Brands, Ltd., to Peter C.
Lovenheim (Jan. 6, 1983) (on file with the author).
192. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to Ralph L. Halpern, Gen. Counsel for Iroquois Brands,
Ltd., (Jan. 11, 1983) (on file with the author).
193. Notice 1983 Notice of Annual Meeting, supra note 186, at 17-19.
194. Id. at 19.
195. Id.
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proposal would entail costs in excess of the expected profitability of the
product.196
As he stated he would, Lovenheim appeared at that annual
shareholder meeting and presented his proposal.197 In his presentation,
Lovenheim offered a point-by-point refutation of management’s
198
He pointed out that FDA regulation does not encompass
arguments.
any test for humane treatment.199 “You can import brains pulled from
the skulls of live dogs, and the FDA would accept it for importation,”
Lovenheim noted.200 Lovenheim next noted that it simply was not true
that Iroquois had no control over the production of the product, since
consumers can always pressure producers to change their production
processes.201 Lovenheim also addressed management’s concerns about
the cost of expert consultation on the matter by pointing out that the
experts in question would likely be academics, who do not charge much
for their services.202 If the charges proved excessive, Lovenheim
offered, the Humane Society would provide expert consultations at no
cost.203 Finally, Lovenheim urged shareholders’ to reject management’s
position that humane treatment of animals was simply too costly.204 “I
say that if an investigation would cost too much, then we should stop
selling the product, or if we are to continue selling the product, then we
should have the investigation.”205 Another shareholder then rose in
support of Lovenheim’s proposal.206 In the ensuing vote, Lovenheim’s
proposal garnered 50,000 votes, just over 5% of those cast.207
B.

The Goose Chase: From Proponent to Litigant

Encouraged by this result, Lovenheim offered the same resolution
the following year.208 He wrote well in advance to seek information
196. Id.
197. 1983 Annual Meeting Transcript, supra note 180, at 10.
198. Id. at 15-18.
199. Id. at 16.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 17.
203. Id. at 16-17.
204. Id. at 17.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 18 (“[I]t seems to me since it is such a cruel way to obtain [liver pâté], it would
be a feather in Iroquois’ hat to do without it.”).
207. Memorandum of Law, supra note 14, at 2.
208. Shareholder Proposal and Supporting Statement (submitted by Peter Lovenheim for
inclusion in Iroquois Brands’ 1984 Proxy Statement) (included as Attachment 3 to the Affidavit of
Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 160) (Dec. 5, 1983) (on file with the author).
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regarding the date for the upcoming shareholder meeting.209 To
Lovenheim’s surprise, the company responded this time by notifying
him (through corporate counsel) that Iroquois considered the proposal
excludable.210 During the intervening year, the SEC had again revised
its regulations.211
The SEC now required shareholders to own at least 1% or $1,000
worth of the corporation’s stock for at least one year prior to the
submission of the proposal.212 In addition, the rules now permitted
exclusion of proposals relating to business operations accounting for less
than 5% of the issuer’s total assets and for less than 5% of net earnings
and gross sales and not otherwise significantly related to the issuer's
business.213 Thus, when Lovenheim submitted his proposal in 1983,
which was virtually identical to the one submitted one year earlier,
Iroquois’ only response was to copy him on a letter to the SEC, which
stated its intention to omit the proposal from its proxy statement on the
ground that it related “to operations which account for less than 5
percent of [Iroquois’] total assets . . . and for less than 5 percent of its net
earnings and gross sales . . . and is not otherwise significantly related to”
Iroquois’ business.214
However, as Lovenheim pointed out in his responsive
memorandum of law, Iroquois thus did nothing more than re-state the
purportedly applicable SEC rule.215 Such a simple assertion was not
sufficient to meet the corporation’s burden, said Lovenheim, under the
applicable federal regulations.216 In any case, Lovenheim argued, even

209. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to James P. McCaffrey, President, Iroquois Brands, Ltd.,
(Oct. 19, 1983) (on file with the author).
210. Letter from Ralph L. Halpern, Gen. Counsel for Iroquois Brands, Ltd., to Peter C.
Lovenheim (Nov. 2. 1983) (on file with the author).
211. Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 20,091, 1983 WL 33272 (Aug.
16, 1983). The story behind this revision was been told in some detail in scholarship published not
long after its adoption. See Cane, supra note 16, at 62-67 (characterizing the SEC’s motivation in
formulating the revisions as proposing a total reexamination of the reasons for the rule’s existence).
Liebeler, supra note 32, at 433-37 (describing the three approaches considered by the SEC before it
adopted the first of those options in the 1983 amendments).
212. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(1)(i) (1984).
213. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1984).
214. Letter from Ralph L. Halpern, Gen. Counsel for Iroquois Brands, Ltd., to SEC, Div. of
Corp. Fin. (Dec. 13, 1983) (on file with the author) (included as Attachment 4 to the Affidavit of
Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 160).
215. See Memorandum of Law, supra note 14, at 4 (“The letter . . . contains nothing more than
a simple assertion that the Proposal is covered by Rule 14a-8(c)(5).”).
216. Id. at 5 (citing 41 Fed. Reg. § 234 at 52997 (1976)) (stating that the issuer bears the
burden of demonstrating it may rely upon one of the substantive grounds for omission of a
shareholder proposal).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/6

28

Telman: Is the Quest for Corporate Responsibility a Wild Goose Chase?

11- TELMAN_MACRO FINAL.DOCM

2012]

2/24/2012 9:59 AM

IS THE QUEST FOR CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY A WILD GOOSE CHASE?

319

if it were true that the product at issue did not constitute 5% of Iroquois’
assets, earnings, or sales, Iroquois could not show that the product was
not “otherwise significantly related” to its business.217 Setting aside the
broader social importance of animal cruelty, Lovenheim argued that,
given that Iroquois was a health food company, whose major product
lines included natural vitamins, herb teas and other natural foods that did
not include any animal products in their ingredients, the proposal was
significantly related to Iroquois’ economic interests.218 This was
especially so, Lovenheim contended, because consumers of health food
and natural food products are more likely to value humane treatment of
animals than is the general public.219 Lovenheim cited to Iroquois’
advertisements of its products in magazines such as Vegetarian Times
and Prevention, both of which clearly were marketed towards audiences
concerned about animal cruelty.220
Finally, Lovenheim argued that the SEC, in using the phrase
“significantly related” in the relevant regulation, did not mean to permit
corporations to omit proposals that related to significant social and
ethical issues.221 The Commission recognized that there are many
instances in which the matter involved in a proposal is significant to an
issuer’s business, even though such significance is not apparent from an
economic viewpoint.222
Addressing none of the legal arguments and factual claims in
Lovenheim’s twenty-page memorandum, the SEC sided with Iroquois in
a two-paragraph no-action letter.223 The SEC simply noted that “[t]here
appears to be some basis for your opinion that the proposal may be
omitted from the Company’s proxy material under Rule 14a-8(c)(5)”
and concluded that there would be no enforcement action if the
Lovenheim proposal were omitted from Iroquois’ proxy materials.224
Lovenheim appealed the decision of the Division of Corporation
Finance to the SEC’s five commissioners.225 His memorandum of law
submitted to the commissioners rehearsed the arguments from his earlier

217. Id. at 6.
218. Id. at 6-7.
219. Id. at 7-9.
220. Id. at 9-10.
221. Id. at 13.
222. Id. (citing 41 Fed. Reg. 234, 52997 (1976)).
223. Response of the Office of Chief Counsel, SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin., Iroquois Brands, Ltd.,
SEC File No. 1-5387 (Jan 23, 1984) (on file with the author).
224. Id.
225. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to SEC (Jan. 30, 1984) (on file with the author)
(appealing SEC’s decision and incorporating Memorandum of Law, supra note 14, at 2).
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memorandum, which it incorporated by reference226 and made the
additional argument that the proposal was not new and had won more
than 5% of votes cast at the 1983 shareholder meeting.227 The
Commission declined review.228
Lovenheim attempted to settle his differences with the corporation
in advance of the annual shareholder meeting. He offered to drop the
shareholder proposal if Iroquois would simply agree to set up a
committee to investigate the methods used for the manufacture of the
pâté distributed by the corporation.229 Lovenheim recommended that
three members of the animal protection community serve as ex officio
members of the committee: one representative from American Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, one representative from the
Humane Society and Lovenheim himself.230 Iroquois was not receptive
to such a settlement.231
Lovenheim was undeterred. In fact, the SEC’s casual, unreflective
decision denying review of his appeal of the SEC staff’s issuance of a
no-action letter infuriated and inspired him.232 He prepared his
shareholder proposal for a third time. On October 17, 1984, he sent the
proposal for inclusion in Iroquois’ 1985 proxy statement.233 Once again,
Iroquois responded with a letter to the SEC stating its intention to omit
Lovenheim’s proposal from its proxy materials.234 This time, the
corporation took the trouble to present some statistics, indicating that the
pâté at issue accounted for less than 0.05% of the corporation’s sales,
less than 0.3% of its net earnings and less than 0.09% of its assets for
1982 and 1983, statistics not expected to change significantly in 1984.235

226. Memorandum of Law, supra note 14, at 1.
227. Id. at 2-3.
228. See Letter from Ralph L. Halpern, Gen. Counsel for Iroquois Brands, Ltd., to SEC Div. of
Corp. Fin. (Dec. 21, 1984 ) (on file with the author). Lovenheim now recalls that he was motivated
to pursue his law suit as much by frustration with the SEC’s cavalier rejection of his legal
arguments as disappointment with Iroquois’ seeming indifference to his concerns. Audio tape:
Interview with Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 171. Lovenheim remembers having typed his legal
memoranda himself, on an electric typewriter, not a word processor, after work in the evenings and
on weekends. Id.
229. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to Ralph L. Halpern, Gen. Counsel for Iroquois Brands,
Ltd. (Apr. 24, 1984) (on file with the author).
230. Id.
231. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to John Hoyt, President of the Humane Soc’y, (May 31,
1984) (on file with the author).
232. Interview with Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 171.
233. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to Iroquois Brands, Ltd. (Oct. 17, 1984) (on file with the
author).
234. Letter from Ralph L. Halpern to SEC Div. of Corp. Fin., supra note 228.
235. Id.
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On January 9, 1985, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance once
again issued a response to Iroquois, stating that it would not recommend
any enforcement action if Iroquois were to omit Lovenheim’s proposal
from its proxy materials.236
C.

Iroquois’ Goose Is Cooked in the D.C. District Court

As a relatively recent law graduate, Lovenheim still had a fresh
recollection of Medical Committee.237 In Lovenheim’s view, that
decision compelled a ruling in his case obligating Iroquois to distribute
his proposal, because it raised a socially significant issue that was related
to Iroquois’ business. So Lovenheim bypassed an appeal to the SEC
commissioners and filed suit in the D.C. District Court238 seeking an
injunction ordering Iroquois to distribute his proposal.239 This time, he
retained Jonathan Eisenberg, an experienced attorney who agreed to
work pro bono and to help him on the brief submitted in support of his
suit for injunctive relief.240 Lovenheim’s motivation in skipping review
by the Commission may have been to save time and resources. It also
may have been strategic, since at oral argument in the District Court, his
counsel argued that the court owed no deference to a decision by the
SEC’s staff to issue a no-action letter.241 It may well have proved harder
to persuade the court that it owed no deference to the SEC
Commissioners’ interpretation of the agency’s own rules.
Jonathan Eisenberg acknowledged during oral argument that
Lovenheim did not bring the proposal because he expected it to win a
majority of the shareholder vote.242 Rather, the purpose was to “force
management to take a hard look at the conduct they are engaged in” and

236. Response of the Office of Chief Counsel, SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin., dated Jan. 29, 1985 (on
file with the author).
237. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
238. Section 27 of the ’34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(a), has been construed as permitting appeal
of a no-action letter directly to the Federal District Court. See Lovenheim, v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd.,
618 F. Supp. 554, 558 (D.D.C. 1985). (noting the parties’ agreement that section 27 governs and
that jurisdiction was proper because Lovenheim had alleged that Iroquois violated securities laws in
the jurisdiction by causing misleading proxy materials to be mailed there).
239. Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. at 556.
240. Tischler, supra note 13, at 41-42.
241. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 15, at 17-18
(statement of counsel for the Plaintiff contending that because Lovenheim had not sought
Commission review there was no reason for the court to show deference to the SEC staff’s issuance
of a no-action letter).
242. Id. at 5 (acknowledging that shareholder proposals almost never succeed); See also Dent,
supra note 32, at 4-5 (“[N]o shareholder proposal opposed by management . . . has ever come close
to receiving a majority shareholder vote.”).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 6

11- TELMAN_MACRO FINAL.DOCM

322

2/24/2012 9:59 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[45:291

to “ask themselves whether they can defend that” conduct.243 Eisenberg
contended that the effectiveness of this tactic was evidenced by the fact
that in 1982, thirty-two shareholder proposals had been withdrawn as
moot, suggesting that the corporations chose to adopt the measures
proposed rather than put them to a shareholder vote.244 Eisenberg
reminded the court that the proposal had won 5% of the shareholder vote
when it had been included in Iroquois’ 1983 proxy materials and stated
that if the proposal were again included, he believed there to be “a
significant chance” that Iroquois would decide to discontinue
distribution of the product.245
On the law, Eisenberg encouraged the court to consider the relevant
regulation, 14a-8(c)(5), as constituting a two-part test, both of which
have to be met for the corporation to be permitted to exclude a
proposal.246 Lovenheim did not challenge Iroquois’ claim that the
economic portion of 14a-8(c)(5) was met,247 but Eisenberg stressed that
in 1976 the SEC rewrote the regulation, removing language that
permitted the corporation to omit a proposal “if it is submitted primarily
for general political, social ends” and adding language permitting
omission of proposals that are not economically significant and “that are
not significantly related to the issuer’s business.”248
The effect of the change was, in Eisenberg’s view, to eliminate
from the SEC’s regulation any indication that social proposals “were
suspect.”249 Since the 1976 changes, the SEC had required that all social
proposals be included so long as the issuer’s business was in any way
implicated in the proposal.250 Eisenberg’s argument suggests that the
SEC learned from Medical Committee and sought to avoid a head-on
collision with the judiciary over whether or not it could permit exclusion

243. Id. at 5-6.
244. Id. at 6. But see Dent, supra note 32, at 21-22 (arguing that it is extremely unlikely that
corporate management would change policies in response to shareholder proposals that are
resoundingly defeated).
245. Id. at 7.
246. See id. at 9 (“As a two part test it is stated in the conjunctive not the disjunctive. So you
clearly have to meet both parts of the test in order to omit the proposal.”).
247. See id. at 8 (“[W]e do accept that this proposal is not economically significant under the
SEC’s 5 percent test”). See also Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. at 559 (“Plaintiff does not contest that his
proposed resolution relates to a matter of little economic significance . . . .”).
248. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 15, at 12-13.
249. Id. at 13.
250. See id. at 13-14 (suggesting that the SEC wanted to comfort people when it changed the
rule again in 1982 by pointing out the SEC did not intend to change its policies with respect to
requiring that proposals relating to social, political, and ethical issues be included in proxy
materials).
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of social proposals without undermining Congress’ intent in passing
section 14(a) of the ’34 Act.251
The requirement that the proposal be significantly related was met
here, Eisenberg contended, because Iroquois made $70,000 worth of
sales in pâté de foie gras.252 If the issue was significant and the
corporation was doing even “one completely outrageous thing a year,”
Eisenberg maintained, the corporation could not refuse to include a
proposal relating to that conduct on the ground that it was not
economically significant, in that the conduct did not relate to 5% of the
corporation’s assets.253
Counsel for Iroquois stressed that the connection between the issue
raised by the proposal and Iroquois’ business was “de minimis,” and that
the SEC could not possibly have intended to require corporations to
include in proxy statements every single social proposal that had any
conceivable connection to the corporation’s operations.254 Pâté de foie
gras accounted for only a tiny portion of Iroquois’ business.255
According to the affidavit of its president, Iroquois had annual revenues
256
of $141 million, $6 million in annual profits and $78 million in assets.
Its sales of pâté amounted to just $79,000, resulting in a net loss of
257
The company valued its total assets related to pâté at
$3,121.
$34,000.258 Accordingly, Iroquois thought it was well within its rights
under the relevant SEC rule to deny Lovenheim’s request.
Iroquois argued, in essence, that the main point of 14a-8(c)(5) was
to make certain that proposals relate to significant portions of the
issuer’s business, even if they raise significant political, social or ethical
issues.259 Corporations are business entities. They and the SEC are
primarily interested in economic matters, Iroquois argued, with respect

251. See id. at 14 (arguing that the history of the regulation “suggests very, very strongly that
in response to the Medical Committee decision, the commission learned that it couldn’t exclude
proposals raising significant ethical or social issues that were related to the issuer’s business”).
252. Id. at 15-16.
253. Id. at 16.
254. Id. at 21-22 (statement of Hadrian Katz, counsel for Iroquois).
255. Lovenheim, v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 558 (D.D.C. 1985).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 558-59.
259. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 15, at 23
(contending that Plaintiff’s construction of the Rule would delete the economic tests from the rule
and allow in any proposal that relates to an important social issue).
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to proxy statements as in all other areas.260 Medical Committee, as
Iroquois understood it, stood only for the proposition that a corporation
may not exclude a proposal simply on the ground that it raises ethical
and philosophical issues.261 The opinion did not require the inclusion of
proposals that are of no real economic significance to the corporation.262
The court sided with Lovenheim on the decisive point. Although
Medical Committee was decided under an earlier version of the Rule and
the economic significance of Dow’s production of napalm was not an
issue in the case, the court noted that the D.C. Circuit, in deciding
Medical Committee, had assumed that “napalm was not economically
significant to Dow.”263 After a brief review of the Rule, the court
concluded that there was simply no evidence that the SEC intended to
limit its understanding of the “significance” of a proposal to economic
criteria, as Iroquois suggested it should.264 The court recognized the
social significance of Lovenheim’s proposal and the fact that it
“implicate[d] significant levels of sales” for Iroquois.265 It therefore
granted Lovenheim the injunctive relief he sought.266
The court’s factual findings were significant. As evidence of the
social significance of Lovenheim’s proposal, the court provided only a
footnote referencing Lovenheim’s brief.267 Lovenheim had argued that
humane treatment of animals is a “foundation of western culture.”268 In
support of this argument, he cited the Seven Laws of Noah,269 as well as
animal protection statutes beginning with one enacted by the
270
By the time of the litigation,
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641.
such statutes had been enacted in all fifty states.271
A court might have considered such evidence as strikingly weak, as
none of it specifically addressed a state interest in regulating the force-

260. See id. at 24 (“The criterion for the inclusion of material in corporate annual reports in
filings with the SEC in proxy statements and in all other areas, is the economic materiality of the
issue.”).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. at 560 (citing Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d
659, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
264. Id. at 561.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 562.
267. Id. at 559 n.8.
268. Id.
269. See Genesis 9:4 (prohibiting consumption of flesh taken from a live animal).
270. Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. at 559 n.8.
271. Id.
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feeding of geese.272 At the time the case was decided, Lovenheim could
not have cited to a single federal, state, or locality that had attempted to
regulate the force-feeding of geese.273 Indeed, at oral argument,
Iroquois’ counsel made the policy argument that corporations should not
have to decide “which issues are sufficiently important to be put to the
shareholders on philosophical and ethical terms and which issues are
not.”274 Iroquois’ counsel obviously thought that the issue of forcefeeding of geese in France was not significant,275 a view apparently
shared by “proxy resolution aficionados.”276 Even Lovenheim’s counsel
came very close to conceding that the issue was not as significant as the
use of napalm raised in Medical Committee.277 Neither party offered
expert testimony on the political, social, or ethical significance of the
issue. One is hard pressed to imagine where such expertise would reside
or why it should reside in a corporation, in the SEC, or in a court. 278

272. Better evidence of the social significance of Lovenheim’s proposal was furnished in
Loveheim’s affidavit, which cited efforts by “leading organizations in the field of animal care” to
discourage the practice of force-feeding. Id. Still, it is not clear why the fact that some
organizations with a special interest in an issue raise that issue should be treated as evidence of
widespread concern.
273. The first such regulation was introduced in California in 2004. Under the new law, as of
July 1, 2012, “[a] product may not be sold in California if it is the result of force feeding a bird for
the purpose of enlarging the bird's liver beyond normal size.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
25982 (West 2009). The City of Chicago attempted a ban on foie gras in 2006, but it apparently
was not enforced. See, e.g., Josh Noel, Let 'em Eat Foie Gras, They Declare; Almost 4 Months After
Ban, A Number of Restaurants Appear to be Dishing Up the Delicacy with Impunity, CHIC. TRIB.,
Dec. 21, 2006, at C1 (suggesting the city’s Department of Public Health was hesitant to fine
restaurants that ignored a ban on the product); Josh Noel et al., Chicago’s Wild Foie Gras Chase:
Mayor Daley Calls the Ban the ‘Silliest’ Law. Restaurants Across Town Serve up the Delicacy in
Defiance. Now the Question is Whether City Officials Will Actually Try to Enforce the New Law,
CHIC. TRIB., Aug. 23, 2006, at C1 (reporting brisk sales of foie gras after Mayor Daley denounced a
ban on the product as the “silliest law” ever passed by the City Council). The ban was officially
lifted in May 2008. Mark Caro & Dan Mihalopoulos, Daley Special: Foie Gras Back on the Menu,
CHIC. TRIB., May 15, 2008, at A1.
274. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 15, at 25.
275. See id. (“Now, I am prepared to concede today, with tongue a little bit in cheek . . . that
their issue about the geese in France is a very important issue.”).
276. See Cane, supra note 16, at 61 (noting the notoriety of Lovenheim’s proposal).
277. Comparing the Lovenheim case to Medical Committee, Eisenberg said, “We think that
although this case arises in a less – not less serious, in a different faculty context, that the issue
again is pretty much the same.” Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra
note 15, at 12.
278. See Palmiter, supra note 44, at 905-06 (“Rule 14a-8’s ‘proper subject’ jurisprudence
flounders without any hope of judicial or legislative correction.”).
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Determining which issues are “important” is not within the institutional
competence of any of those bodies.279
Leaving significance aside, there was also the question of what
constitutes “significantly related” to the business operations of the
issuer.280 Lovenheim’s counsel offered that a proposal advocating that
the corporation cease doing business in South Africa would be
excludable if the corporation did not in fact do business there and that a
proposal like Lovenheim’s would not have to be submitted to the
shareholders of IBM if IBM did not import pâté de foie gras.281 But
Iroquois’ counsel countered that “clever and imaginative lawyers will
always be able to think of some tenuous link to the business of the
corporation.”282 A shareholder might argue that there is a significant
relation between IBM’s business operations and pâté de foie gras if it
offers the delicacy for purchase in its employee cafeteria once a
month.283 In response, Eisenberg noted that the problem had not
arisen; IBM shareholders had brought no proposals objecting to the
items on the menu in the employee cafeteria.284
Nor is the basis clear for the court’s finding that sales of pâté de
foie gras “implicated significant levels of sales” for Iroquois Brands.285
The court had earlier noted that, because sales of pâté de foie gras
accounted for only $34,000 of the company’s assets, and that sales of
pâté de foie gras had resulted in a net loss, the proposal implicated
“none of the company’s net earnings and less than 0.05% of its
assets.”286 In a footnote, the court noted that the result in the case would
have been different if the proposal had no “meaningful relationship to
the business of” the corporation.287 Still, the court’s willingness to
accept as socially significant any proposal relating to a subject about
which some national non-profit organizations had expressed concern,
coupled with its willingness to think it significantly related to a business
if it accounts for 0.05% of a corporations’ assets, suggested that

279. See id. at 910 (“[T]he current rule’s attempt at merit regulation lays on the staff the
impossible task of deducing what should be of interest to investment-minded and public-minded
shareholders and what should not be of interest.”).
280. Transcript, Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 15, at 13.
281. Id. at 15.
282. Id. at 27.
283. Id. at 26.
284. Id. at 28.
285. Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 561 (D.D.C. 1985).
286. Id. at 559-60.
287. Id. at 561 n.16.
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corporations could be obligated to distribute shareholder proposals on
nearly any subject that in any way related to their businesses.
There was a great deal of media interest in the case, with articles
appearing in The Washington Post,288 The Los Angeles Times,289 and
290
among other newspapers.291
The
The Wall Street Journal,
Washington Post was especially vocal in its support for Lovenheim’s
brand of shareholder activism: “There isn’t a company in the country
that couldn’t benefit from 10 tough questions from stockholders at its
annual meeting this year. But there probably isn’t one company in 10
that will face them.”292 Given the timing of the opinion, Iroquois had to
acquiesce, as there was insufficient time to appeal the decision before
the next annual shareholder meeting,293 which was held just weeks after
the District Court’s decision.294
Lovenheim attended the meeting, as required under the regulations,
and he presented his proposal to the shareholders and their proxies. The
reception was far from warm.295 Lovenheim’s proposal received less
296
As a result,
than 8% of the votes cast by Iroquois’ shareholders.
Iroquois would not be required to include Lovenheim’s proposal or
another proposal on the same subject matter for three years.297 Despite
the court victory and the publicity, ordinary shareholders were
298
Or were they? Within months of the shareholder meeting,
unmoved.

288. Philip Smith, Shareholders to Be Given Pâté Question, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1985, at
E3; Jerry Knight, Force-Feeding Moral Issues onto Corporate Agendas, WASH. POST, Mar. 11,
1985, at Bus. 1.
289. Michael A. Hiltzik, Ruling Aids Resolutions on Ethical Issues, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1985,
at B2.
290. Ingersoll, supra note 159.
291. Timothy Bannon, Where’s the Liver?, UPI, MAR. 2, 1985, available at, LEXIS, News.
292. Knight, supra note 288.
293. Ralph Halpern, Iroquois’ general counsel at the time of the litigation recalls that there was
no time to appeal the decision before the annual shareholder meeting. Telephone interview with
Ralph Halpern, supra note 172.
294. Tischler, supra note 13, at 42. The District Court’s order is dated March 27, 1985. See
Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. 554. Iroquois’ shareholder meeting was held six weeks later, on May 14,
1985. See Iroquois Brands, Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders (Apr. 12, 1985) (on file with
the author).
295. Telephone interview with Peter Lovenheim, supra note 162.
296. Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554
(D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-0734).
297. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(12)).
298. See Tischler, supra note 13, at 42 (describing the proposal as having been “roundly
defeated”).
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Iroquois sold the unit responsible for importing pâté de foie gras,
announcing that it now considered the issue put behind the company.299
Lovenheim comes on the tail end of a period in the history of
shareholder proposals when individual shareholders were the dominant
shareholder activists.300 In the 1980s, institutional investors, first church
groups and then pension funds, began to play a leading role in
promulgating shareholder proposals.301 Lovenheim is a paradigmatic
transitional case because, although Peter Lovenheim brought his
proposal in his own behalf, he also did so on behalf of the Humane
Society of the United States.302 Moreover, Lovenheim worked closely
with organizations opposed to animal cruelty in attempting to use his
shareholder proposal as part of a broader strategy to persuade Iroquois to
stop marketing pâté de foie gras. His case suggests the difficulties an
individual investor might face in trying to put pressure on a corporation
through the mechanism of the shareholder proposal and thus illustrates
why the transition from individual shareholder activists to institutional
activism might have occurred.
D.

Lovenheim’s Further Adventures in Animal Law

After his experience with Iroquois, Lovenheim, having returned to
his native Rochester, began offering his services as a sort of freelance

299. ORLANS, supra note 165, at 231, (citing personal correspondence with Ralph L. Halpern,
Jaeckle, Fleischmann & Mugel (Apr. 13, 1988)). Although Lovenheim believes that his shareholder
proposal and the adverse publicity associated with it influenced Iroquois’ decision to discontinue the
product, Halpern contends that he remembers quite clearly that the controversy over Lovenheim’s
proposal had nothing to do with the corporation’s decision to discontinue a product that was a tiny
portion of its business and had never been profitable for the corporation. Telephone interview with
Ralph Halpern (July 10, 2009).
300. See Gillian & Starks, supra note 25, at 56 (providing a short history of shareholder
activism and noting that the eclipse of individual investors as the proponents of shareholder
proposals began in the mid-1980s).
301. See Ryan, supra note 44, at 157-59 (1988) (reporting that institutional investors targeted
around fifty corporations for shareholder proposals in 1987). Church sponsored proposals
accounted for 10.97% of all shareholder proposals in the 1979-80 proxy season and 14.02% of such
proposals in 1982-83. Liebeler, supra note 32, app. at tbl.2. In the twenty-first century, pension
funds such as the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS) have taken a leading
role in the shareholder proposal movement. Press Release, Ca. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., CalPERS Steps
up Pace of Shareholder Activism, (Aug. 13, 2007), CALPERS.CA.GOV available at
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2007/aug/steps-up-shareowneractivism.xml (last visited Aug. 23. 2009). In 2007, CalPERS alone filed thirty-three shareholder
proposals. Id. Recently hedge funds have assumed a new prominence among proponents. See
Gillian & Starks, supra note 25, at 68 (describing hedge funds as a dominant force in the
shareholder activism arena).
302. Letter from Peter C. Lovenhein to Terrence J. Fox, supra note 182.
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drafter of shareholder proposals for non-profit organizations.303 He
worked with People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), and
helped them start an ongoing program aimed at bringing animal
protection issues to the attention of corporations through shareholder
304
Lovenheim also teamed up with Henry Spira, a brilliant
proposals.
tactician in the art of “constructive shaming,” which involves pressuring
corporations into cooperating with advocates for the ethical treatment of
animals.305 Spira’s biographer, Peter Singer, describes him as follows:
Henry Spira [was] a bushy-haired New York high school teacher who
spoke with a broad accent that came from years spent on ships as a
sailor in the merchant marine and on the General Motors assembly line
in New Jersey. [Revlon’s vice president for investor relations, Roger]
Shelley saw that Henry’s clothes were crumpled, that he rarely wore a
tie, and that when he did, he seemed incapable of getting it to meet his
collar.

But that wasn’t all that Shelley noticed: “There was not one ounce of
product on his body that was produced by an animal, and that included
his belt, that included shoes, that included everything . . . Here was a
man who did what he said he would do.”306
Singer chronicles Spira’s career as an advocate for animals. From
1975-1977, Spira organized a campaign to end animal experimentation
at New York’s Museum of Natural History.307 Spira and his colleagues
not only highlighted the suffering of the animals that were the subject of
308
the experiments in the museum, they were also able to show that the
research was more or less useless.309 The museum closed and
310
dismantled its laboratories.
Spira next pressured Amnesty International into ceasing its support
for a group of scientists that was torturing pigs in order to learn whether

303. See Peter Lovenheim, Stock in “Unsavory” Companies Is Potent Tool to Influence
Option, NONPROFIT TIMES, Oct. 1, 1990, at 29 (describing Lovenheim as a New York based
attorney who prepares and files shareholder proposals for nonprofits).
304. Tischler, supra note 13, at 43.
305. See generally PETER SINGER, ETHICS INTO ACTION: HENRY SPIRA AND THE ANIMAL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1998).
306. Id. at x.
307. Id. at 54-74.
308. See id. at 66 (describing experiments on cats involving deafening, blinding, destruction of
the sense of smell, removal of brain parts, severing of nerves in the penis and castration).
309. See id. at 67 (reporting that Science staff writer Nicholas Wade discovered that 14 of the
21 scientific papers produced by the researchers had never been cited and the others were cited
infrequently).
310. Id. at 71.
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torture could be conducted without leaving visible traces.311 There
followed a successful campaign to repeal New York’s Metcalf-Hatch
Act, which allowed medical researchers to seize unclaimed dogs and
cats from animal shelters.312 Spira then launched a series of campaigns
against corporations engaged in inhumane treatment of animals,
including: a largely successful campaign to get Revlon to develop new
ways to test eye irritancy and thus to stop blinding rabbits in order to test
313
the safety of its products; a campaign that greatly reduced the use of a
brutal product safety process, LD50, which involves determining the
dose at which a substance is lethal to 50% of the animals tested;314 and a
far less successful effort to expose inhumane treatment of chickens by
315
the Perdue Farms corporation.
Spira next teamed up with Temple Grandin, a designer of livestock
handling facilities and a Professor of Animal Science at Colorado State
University, to replace the “shackle and hoist” method for the ritual
slaughter of cattle with a more humane upright restraining system that
Grandin designed.316 There followed an equally successful campaign to
end the USDA’s policy of face-branding Mexican cattle.317 Aiming at a
larger impact on the farm animal industry, Spira next targeted
318
Spira’s usual strategy was to use the threat of adverse
McDonald’s.
publicity to bring corporations to the table. He would send to
corporations drafts of full-page ads destined for major newspapers. The
ads illustrated animal cruelty associated with the corporation's business.
If the corporation did not agree to talk, the ads would appear. With
Lovenheim’s assistance, Spira supplemented that tactic with a
shareholder proposal, calling on McDonald’s to form a committee to
investigate the effect of factory farming on animals used in McDonald’s
food products.319
Together, Lovenheim and Spira were able to persuade McDonald’s
to adopt three basic principles to help assure humane treatment of the

311. See id. at 75-77 (describing Spira’s victory in a short, cerebral campaign, which Spira
celebrated by becoming a member of Amnesty International).
312. Id. at 78-83.
313. Id. at 86-111.
314. Id. at 114-29.
315. Id. at 142-49.
316. Id. at 156-60.
317. Id. at 161-64.
318. See id. at 166 (indicating that Spira’s aim was to get McDonald’s to give 0.01% “of its
gross revenues to fund a research center dedicated to finding alternatives to stressful confinement of
factory farming.”).
319. Tischler, supra note 13, at 43.
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animals used in McDonald’s products.320
In the several years
Lovenheim worked with Spira, he claims they never had to actually
bring a proposal to a vote in a shareholder meeting. Spira had won a
reputation for openness to reasonable compromise. He worked with
corporations until they agreed to adopt measures that would enhance
their reputations for corporate responsibility. The result was almost
invariably at least a partial adoption of the substance of the proposals
that Spira and Lovenheim brought.321
Lovenheim’s story thus suggests that shareholder proposals have
consequences that go beyond their effects on the corporation to which
the proposal originally relates. Peter Lovenheim began as an amateur
investor who chose to put a relatively small amount of money into
corporations in which he believed. He then learned that one of those
corporations was engaged in a business practice of which he disapproved
and which he considered inconsistent with the business model that had
led him to invest in the first place. He raised his voice, but both the
corporation and the SEC would not hear his complaints. This response
turned Lovenheim into a litigant and, briefly, into an activist. He shared
his expertise in writing shareholder proposals with others who shared his
political goals. And one thing led to another. For a time at least, Peter
Lovenheim was transformed by his experience as a proponent into
someone who worked with others to promote social change through
mechanisms that were not limited to the shareholder proposal
mechanism.
IV. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP
AND CONTROL
Lovenheim322 and Medical Committee323 illustrate the
determination and resolve required of any shareholder who wants to get
a proposal before the shareholders of a corporation. In both cases, the
proponents of the proposal either represented or had the strong, active
support of an organization. Lovenheim was an attorney who was not
intimidated by the procedural hurdles shareholders face. As such, he
was exceptional. It is in fact very rare—and it was even rarer at the time
of Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands—for disappointed proponents to

320.
321.
322.
323.
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challenge no-action letters.324 Up until 1990, there were only thirteen
reported cases reviewing SEC determinations on shareholder
proposals.325 As the Medical Committee court noted, the SEC’s process
for reviewing proposals was far from transparent and often resulted in
corporations being permitted to omit proposals for reasons that were not
effectively communicated to the proponents of those proposals.326
For opponents of shareholder proposals, the fact that the proponent
in Medical Committee was an organization that promoted social causes
and that Lovenheim had close ties with such an organization highlights
the problem of shareholder social proposals. Opponents of shareholder
proposals view shareholders primarily as passive investors seeking an
economic return.327 So viewed, their only interest in political or social
issues ought to be with the effect of such issues on the return on their
investment in the corporation. As one critic of the Rule put it:
“Stockholder participatory democracy is a myth; investors do not buy
stock in public companies with any serious expectation of influencing
management.328 The Wall Street Rule is the only practical rule by
which sensible investors are governed. Small investors who do not like
management sell their shares.”329 If the issue is essentially an economic
one, say the social proposal skeptics, then it ought to be left for
corporate managers to decide in the exercise of their business
judgment.330 If the issue is not economic, then it has no business being
before any corporate body.
Lovenheim conceded that his proposal was likely to fail and that,
even if it passed, it would require only that the corporation form a
committee to study the methods used in the production of pâté de foie
gras and to make recommendations for further distribution of the
product in light of its findings.331 The Lovenheim court made clear that

324. Palmiter, supra note 44, at 881.
325. Id.
326. See Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 674 (noting that “the shareholder often has no idea why his
proposal was deemed unworthy or what he can do to cure its defects for subsequent proxy
solicitations”).
327. Cane, supra note 16, at 61.
328. Liebeler, supra note 32, at 447.
329. Id. at 447. Liebeler defines the Wall Street Rule as “the practice by investors unhappy
with management of selling their shares in the market rather than trying to alter management’s
behavior or the management team.” Id. at 447 n.123.
330. See Cane, supra note 16, at 61 (noting that those who view shareholders as passive
investors tend to think shareholder proposals ought to be permitted only when they relate to internal
corporate governance issues or with issues that have a demonstrable economic effect on the
corporation).
331. Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 561 (D.D.C. 1985).
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the proposal’s poor prospects for success did not excuse the corporation
332
It is hard to imagine
from its obligation to distribute the proposal.
why the SEC would have intended to permit corporate resources to be
utilized in such a way. And yet, in the two decades since Lovenheim
was decided, neither Congress nor the SEC has taken action to reign in
social proposals. On the contrary, the SEC routinely cites to Lovenheim
in denying no-action letters to corporations.333 This final section offers
an explanation of why that is the case.
A.

The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Proposals

In connection with its 1984 revisions to Rule 14a-8, the SEC
circulated a questionnaire in order to gauge interested parties’ attitudes
towards shareholder proposals. Nearly three of four respondents agreed
or strongly agreed that shareholder proposals are “a waste of
management’s time and the corporation’s money.”334 Most respondents
did not agree that proposals are an efficient or effective outlet for
concerned shareholders, although the votes were more evenly split on
whether the proposals are an “effective way of keeping management
aware of shareholder concerns.”335
Although corporation counsel tends to regard shareholder proposals
as a nuisance,336 the overall costs associated with such proposals do not
seem to be that significant.337 One scholar estimated the total cost at
about $15 million/year as of 1992.338 In 1975-1976, AT&T estimated
that it spent $112,450 in including five proposals in its proxy materials,
339
A 1981
while it spent $41,140 on eleven others that it omitted.

332. See id. (finding that Iroquois misstated the significance of the Rule, which the court
viewed as guaranteeing shareholder access to proxy statements “whether or not their proposals are
likely to pass and regardless of the immediate force of the resolution if enacted”).
333. See, e.g,. Raytheon Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 890011, at *7 (Mar. 30, 2009)
(citing to Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. 554 in denying corporation’s request for a no-action letter);
Denny’s Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Denny’s Corporation, 2009 WL 772857, at *13 (March 17,
2009).
334. See Cane, supra note 16, at 70 (reporting that 72.9% of respondents agreed that
shareholder proposals are a waste of time and money).
335. See id. (reporting that while only 28.7% found proposals an efficient outlet for concerned
shareholders and only 32% found proposals effective, 41% agreed that the proposals are effective
for keeping management informed, with only 42.6% disagreeing with that statement).
336. See Chilgren, supra note 46, at 304 (outlining the course of a typical shareholder proposal
from the corporation’s perspective and highlighting the expense to the corporation at each stage).
337. See id. at 305 (providing a conservative estimate of the cost to the corporation per
proposal of “$1,700 of good hard cash.”).
338. Palmiter, supra note 44, at 883.
339. Liebeler, supra note 32, at 454.
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survey of eighteen major corporations indicated an average cost of
340
In the past two years, the SEC has
$94,775 per proposal submitted.
responded to between 300 and 450 requests for no-action letters each
year.341 Around the time of the Lovenheim case, the SEC reported that
it devoted only 1,208 staff hours per year to the review of shareholder
proposals and requests for no-action letters, a rough equivalent to the
time of one full-time employee.342 And subsequent to that report the
Rule was amended343 to require that proponents own significant amounts
of stock for one year before submitting their proposal, thus eliminating
the danger that proponents with no real interest in the corporation abuse
the shareholder proposal mechanism in order to get their ideas before
millions of investors at the corporation’s expense.344 Even the most
determined opponents of the proposal concede that its costs both to
345
corporations and to the SEC are not very significant.
As Lovenheim understood at the outset, shareholder proposals can
succeed in affecting corporate policy even if they do not come close to
winning the shareholder votes necessary for adoption. They thus can be
a highly effective way to persuade corporate management to adopt
socially responsible positions. From a policy perspective, the costs of
shareholder proposals to the SEC and to corporations thus should be
balanced against the possible benefits that derive from such proposals.
The best evidence that such benefits exist is that numerous ideas for
reform of corporate management originated in shareholder proposals but
have been subsequently adopted and implemented by management.346

340. Id.
341. Division of Corporation Finance Shareholder Proposal No-Action Letters Issued Under
Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a8.shtml (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
342. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, 47 Fed. Reg.
47,420, 47,423 n.15 (Oct. 14, 1982).
343. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2010) (requiring that proponents own at least $2,000 worth
of stock or 1% of the shares entitled to vote).
344. See Liebeler, supra note 32, at 425-26 (criticizing the rule for allowing proponents with
only one share of stock to reach millions of investors while bearing little or none of the costs
associated with the distribution of their proposals).
345. See Dent, supra note 32, at 15 (conceding that the SEC estimate of staff time spent
dealing with shareholder proposals is “surprisingly low”); Liebeler, supra note 32, at 454
(concluding that the costs are “not insignificant” but also are not “a substantial portion of the gross
national product”).
346. See Palmiter, supra note 44, at 897-98 (citing: Lewis Gilbert’s advocacy of more liberal
dividend policies and consistent financial accounting:
shareholder proposals calling for
compensation and nominating committee comprised solely of outside directors and improved
mechanisms for disclosure of executive compensation; and the significant number of proposals that
have been withdrawn after a negotiated settlement with management); but see Dent, supra note 32,
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Because proponents benefit corporations and their fellow shareholders,
SEC rules that force corporations to bear the costs of such proposals
make sense. Without them, because proponents of such proposals do not
benefit in a manner that is proportionate to their contribution of time and
effort,347 shareholders would not be adequately incentivized to bring
potentially beneficial proposals.348 Viewed from this perspective, the
Wall Street Rule is inefficient. Proponents with ideas about how to
improve corporations are a resource to the corporation. If their main
recourse is to invest elsewhere, the corporation’s resources are
dissipated.
One scholar has characterized the Rule as a tax imposed on
corporations that pays for a useful mechanism of corporate
governance.349 Corporations may well regard this “tax” as cheaper and
less onerous than government regulation.350 Shareholder proposals
facilitate communication between a corporation’s management and its
owners in a manner that is more open, clear and specific than any other
mechanism for communication between management and shareholders.
B.

The Efficacy of Shareholder Proposals

Justifications for the existence of shareholder proposals relating to
social issues come in two varieties. One variety focuses on the nature of
corporations. It views shareholders not as passive investors but as
owners who have—and should have—an interest in the social and
political impact of a corporation.351 From this perspective, shareholders
have not only a right but a duty to try to influence corporate
management to adopt socially responsible policies. In the years
following the Medical Committee decision, scholars found ample
evidence that corporations were adopting policies on social issues that
were either directly or at least apparently stimulated by shareholder
proposals.352
at 19-22 (calling the effect of shareholder proposals infinitesimal and questioning the factual basis
for claims that corporations actually respond to shareholder proposals).
347. Palmiter, supra note 44, at 896 (noting that the proponent of a value-enhancing proposal
will only benefit in proportion to her shareholdings).
348. See id. (summarizing collective action, free-riding and rational apathy problems that the
rule requiring corporations to assume costs of shareholder proposals is meant to address).
349. See id. at 898 (“[T]he rule acts as a tax on public companies and their shareholders.”).
350. Id. at 899.
351. Cane, supra note 16, at 61.
352. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 22, at 642-43 (finding the Rule justified “by the major
constructive impact it has had on actual corporate behavior” and citing “numerous instances” in
which corporations have taken actions consistent with such proposals); see id. at 643-47 (describing
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The other variety is Melvin Eisenberg’s safety valve theory; that is,
the idea that shareholder proposals provide a useful safety valve in that
they permit shareholders to raise their concerns before management and
their fellow shareholders in a public forum in which the corporation’s
leadership must provide some sort of response.353 As indicated above,354
the safety valve comes at relatively low cost to the corporation.355
But both varieties of defenses of the shareholder proposal process
ultimately sound in a theory of the corporation that recognizes that
corporations have a role in society that is too large to be reduced to
economics. Even those who continue to maintain that corporations exist
“primarily to earn a profit for [their] shareholders,”356 acknowledge that
the law now recognizes “a greatly enlarged social duty and responsibility
of businesses” to care for the “comfort, health and well-being of their
employees.”357 In fact, corporations’ social duty extends well beyond
the well-being of their employees, and there is actually very little
support, either in case law or in statutes, for the notion that corporations
exist primarily for the benefit of their shareholders.358 Rather, corporate
management is permitted to justify its decisions not only with reference
to shareholder interests, but also with reference to the interests of other
stakeholders, which may include the interests of creditors, employees,
customers, and the industry as a whole or even the community at
large.359
360
The case that best illustrates this principle is Shlensky v. Wrigley,
in which minority owners in the corporation that owned the Chicago

the impact of shareholder proposals in promoting: divestment from South Africa; disclosure of
affirmative action and equal opportunity employment programs; disclosure of compliance with Arab
nations’ boycott of Israel; and various initiatives known collectively as “Campaign GM” and
designed to promote more responsible corporate governance).
353. Id. at 635; Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 1494.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 323-31.
355. See Cane, supra note 16, at 57 (characterizing the cost of shareholder proposals to
corporate management as “relatively slight”).
356. COX & HAZEN, supra note 24, at 63; see also Dodge v. Ford Motor Corp., 170 N.W. 668,
684 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders.”).
357. Id. at 66.
358. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VIRG. L. & BUS. REV.
163, 172 (2008) (concluding that corporate charters, state corporation codes and case law provide
no support for the notion that shareholder wealth maximization is a primary purpose of
corporations).
359. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 579 n.1 (1992) (listing twenty-eight jurisdictions that
permit corporate boards to consider the interests of constituencies other than shareholders).
360. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
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Cubs brought suit alleging that the corporation’s directors had breached
361
The
their duty of care by refusing to install lights at Wrigley Field.
shareholders were armed with evidence that the introduction of night
games would boost attendance at Cubs games, since they could show
that the White Sox drew more fans at night games on days when the
Cubs played day games, but the teams attracted roughly equal crowds
when both played day games.362 The President of the corporation,
363
Philip K. Wrigley, offered two reasons for refusing to install lights:
his belief that baseball is a daytime sport; and his concern about the
effect of lights and night baseball on the surrounding neighborhood.364
The court permitted the corporation to place its commitment to certain
ethical or aesthetic principles (“baseball is a daytime sport”) and to the
Wrigleyville neighborhood ahead of the economic interests of its
365
shareholders.
The law on corporate charitable giving is consistent with this
expansive understanding of the purpose of corporations. Corporations
are permitted to make charitable donations without any sort of
requirement that they justify those donations in economic terms.366 In
the landmark case, A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, the New Jersey
Supreme Court enthusiastically embraced the principle that corporations
must supplement their wealth maximizing pursuits with a sense of their
social and ethical responsibility to be good corporate citizens.367
When the wealth of the nation was primarily in the hands of
individuals they discharged their responsibilities as citizens by donating
freely for charitable purposes. With the transfer of most of the wealth to
corporate hands and the imposition of heavy burdens of individual
taxation, they have been unable to keep pace with increased
philanthropic needs. They have therefore, with justification, turned to
corporations to assume the modern obligations of good citizenship in the
same manner as humans do.368
The court noted that its understanding of the need for corporate
social responsibility was shared by Congress and state legislatures which

361. Id. at 777.
362. Id. at 778.
363. Id. at 777.
364. Id. at 778.
365. Id.
366. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 583 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1953) (permitting the
corporation to make a charitable donation to Princeton University, in part because capitalism and
free enterprise depend on the continued existence of private and independent universities).
367. Id. at 586.
368. Id. at 585-86.
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had enacted statutes to encourage corporations to make charitable
369
At the time Barlow was decided, twenty-nine states
contributions.
had passed statutes permitting corporations to make charitable
contributions.370 The Model Business Corporations Act recognizes that
corporations have the same power as an individual to do “all things
necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including
without limitation power: . . . to make donations for the public welfare
371
or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.”
The Rule and the SEC’s permissive approach to social proposals
are understandable in light of the broader doctrine of corporate purposes.
Corporations do not exist primarily to maximize shareholder wealth.
Corporations have become important and powerful legal persons. Social
norms, embodied in laws regulating corporate governance do not
condone the sort of amoral conduct that would result if corporations
were to conceive of themselves purely as vehicles for the production of
wealth. Moreover, in exercising their business judgment for the benefit
of the corporations that they manage, corporate officers and directors do
not want shareholder wealth maximization to define their decisionmaking processes. Enjoying as they do the benefits of deference to their
business decisions that may be influenced by factors other than wealthmaximization, corporate managers cannot deny shareholders the ability
to contribute to the decision-making process through social proposals.
V. CONCLUSION
Judging by the few court cases that address social proposals, one
could easily conclude that cases like Lovenheim are akin to nuisance
suits that have no impact on corporate governance because the proposals
never win anything approaching a majority of the shareholder vote.
However, the cases themselves do not tell the full story behind social
proposals.
While we cannot know for certain whether Peter
Lovenheim’s proposal was the last straw that led Iroquois to discontinue
its distribution of pâté de foie gras, it is clear from his subsequent

369. Id. at 586; see id. at 587 (citing language from 1950 New Jersey statute permitting
corporate charitable donations not in excess of 1 percent of capital and surplus, unless authorized by
shareholders, in order that “encouragement be given to the creation and maintenance of institutions
engaged in community fund, hospital, charitable, philanthropic, educational, scientific or benevolent
activities or patriotic or civic activities conducive to the betterment of social and economic
conditions.”).
370. Id. at 587.
371. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(13) (2003) (emphasis added).
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experiences that social proposals can influence corporate decisionmaking processes.
But are social proposals desirable?
If U.S. citizens want
regulations preventing the distribution of products that promote
inhumane treatment of animals, if they want to outlaw cluster bombs, if
they want universal health care for all citizens or residents, or if they
want all corporations to embrace affirmative action and renounce all
forms of discrimination based on gender, race, religion, national origin,
sexual preference, or gender-identity, why is the political process
inadequate? Why should corporations foot the bill for the dissemination
of all proposals relating to social issues of any significance that also
have some sort of relation to the corporation’s business?
As this Article has argued, the answer lies in the purpose of
corporations. Opponents of social proposals tend to view corporations
as vehicles for the generation of wealth, and they view shareholders as
passive investors concerned only with maximizing the return on their
investment.372 This view of corporations appears to be too narrow.
Both courts and legislatures permit corporate boards, in managing their
corporations, to consider many factors other than shareholder wealth
maximization. The SEC’s and the courts’ permissive approach to social
proposals is thus consistent with other bodies of law that recognize that,
because of the increasingly important role of corporations as legal
persons within our society, there is a general expectation that
corporations will behave responsibly.
While it is difficult to prove that shareholder proposals help them to
do so, the cost to corporations and to society of social proposals is
minimal. The best evidence that their usefulness outweighs the costs
associated with social proposals may be the failure of corporations to
mobilize to oppose them. Corporate managers may recognize the value
of exchange with their shareholders on social issues, and they may also
grudgingly appreciate the consciousness-raising effect that social
proposals can have. Iroquois Brands’ leadership may not have thought
of itself as a corporation that catered to people committed to healthy
lifestyles. However, because of Peter Lovenheim’s proposal, it learned
that it had a reputation for promoting food choices consistent with the
humane treatment of animals. That information was likely useful to the
corporation, even if the process through which the corporation achieved
enlightenment involved some pain and even some embarrassment.

372. See supra text accompanying notes 314-16.
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